Why Camels Aren't as Secret as You Think

Article excerpt

Byline: Joe Adler

WASHINGTON - For banks, the supervisory grade known as a Camels score is a critical and confidential yardstick of strength. But for many in the public, it is a riddle too tantalizing to ignore.

The ratings, in use since 1979, are typically known just to the bank's primary regulator that decides its score, as well as senior management.

While analysts, consultants and others have long argued for public disclosure of Camels ratings, the government's insistence on secrecy has not stopped interested parties from either mimicking the scoring process with reported information, or using clues to try and guess a bank's official rating.

"There is something of an attitude among bank regulators that the public isn't capable of handling this information for fear of sparking runs," says Jerome Fons, an executive vice president at Kroll Bond Ratings. The New York-based company uses failed-bank data to score open institutions.

"It's hard to mimic" Camels "because it's not publicly available. But what I can observe is which banks have been closed and which haven't, and I can correlate those closures to various financial ratios and metrics. We can reverse engineer Camels. That's the bottom line."

Fons' company is part of a cottage industry of private ratings organizations that use publicly available information to create an alternative to Camels for their clients. While Kroll's method works backward from the point of failure, other firms try to create a more direct simulation of the Camels experience. Meanwhile, some experts believe certain public data points provide hints about a bank's actual Camels rating.

"If you gave 10 analysts the" public examination report "of a bank, they would all come up probably with the same estimate of a Camels rating," says Rebel Cole, a finance and real estate professor at DePaul University in Chicago and a former Federal Reserve Board economist. "It raises the issue of: Why do they make such a big deal about the secrecy of the Camels rating?"

Camels was first developed in the 1970s as part of the regulators' Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System. Institutions were judged on five different components under the acronym Camel: capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings and liquidity. The system was revised in 1996, when agencies added the 's' at the end of Camels for "sensitivity to market risk."

Banks receive a score of 1 to 5 for each component, and a final Camels score in that range representing the composite total of the components. As a bank's score gets higher, so too does the regulatory scrutiny. Banks with a 4 or 5 Camels rating are added to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.'s Problem List - also confidential - of institutions with a greater likelihood of failure.

While each bank's score is a tightly kept secret, curious parties such as insurers and even government agencies not privy to what the bank regulators know have sought versions of the ratings for their own purposes. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission, which lacks the official ratings, uses the model offered by Lord Whalen LLC's Institutional Risk Analytics, a private Southern California ratings firm that simulates Camels for its clients.

Insurers that write policies on banks are also interested in the information. In 2005, joint regulatory guidance reminded the public about the confidentiality of Camels ratings after some insurers had asked banks to disclose them. "The insurers want the Camels because it gives them a frame of reference in terms of enterprise risk," says Chris Whalen, senior vice president and managing director for IRA. "When you're writing directors and officers' insurance for a bank, [operational] risk is huge. That is what you're insuring."

Yet most agree it is impossible to replicate the official ratings exactly, since the regulators likely include highly subjective information about individual institutions in determining a Camels score. …