Reason without Freedom: The Problem of Epistemic Normativity


We call beliefs reasonable or unreasonable, justified or unjustified. What does this imply about belief? Can we be held responsible for our beliefs, and perhaps more significantly should we be blamed for our unreasonable convictions? Reason Without Freedom argues that the major problems of epistemology have their roots in this question over responsibility for belief. By drawing on the arguments of Descartes, Locke and Hume - the founders of epistemology - David Owens offers a critical discussion of the current trends in contemporary epistemology. He proposes that the problems we confront today - scepticism, the analysis of knowlege, and debates on epistemic justification- can be tackled only once we have understood the moral psychology of belief. Reason Without Freedom will be essential reading for all those interested in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of mind and action, ethics, and the history of seventeenth and eighteenth- century philosophy.

Additional information

Publisher: Place of publication:
  • London
Publication year:
  • 2000


An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.