Passionate Engines: What Emotions Reveal about Mind and Artificial Intelligence

Passionate Engines: What Emotions Reveal about Mind and Artificial Intelligence

Passionate Engines: What Emotions Reveal about Mind and Artificial Intelligence

Passionate Engines: What Emotions Reveal about Mind and Artificial Intelligence

Synopsis

In this unique contribution to philosophical debate, Craig DeLancey shows that our best understanding of emotion provides essential insight on key issues in philosophy of mind and artificial intelligence. DeLancey offers us a bold new approach to the study of the mind based on the latest scientific research, and provides an accessible overview of the science of emotion and explanation of the technical issues that arise, with minimal jargon.

Excerpt

In chapter 1, I observed that one thing that might distinguish affects is their cognitive contents (or perhaps their relations to these contents). This would be an approach that is consistent with the various cognitivist theories of emotion. My purpose in this chapter is to address cognitivism and show that it is an untenable view of the basic emotions if it is meant to define them or otherwise explain their necessary nature. in recent years, many criticisms of cognitivism about emotions have been made (see Deigh 1994; de Sousa 1987; Gordon 1987; Griffiths 1989, 1997; Stocker 1987; Stocker and Hegeman 1996). These various criticisms have not, however, touched upon the important scientific evidence, especially from neural science, that is inconsistent with cognitivism about emotions. in this chapter, I use a sampling of this evidence to explore why cognitivism is inadequate. This will also, as in chapter 1, provide an opportunity to support my overarching themes: the affect program theory, a hierarchical and bottomup view of mind, and an enriched naturalism.

Cognitivism about emotions presumably arises from the observation that affects can be about something: they can be representational states, even propositional attitudes. Some scholars have attempted to reduce affects to propositional attitudes like belief or judgment, or at least to claim that affects require these kind of states. in philosophy, the most common attempts at reduction of affects have generally been made for emotions, although some have also attempted to so reduce desire. Here I will criticize only theories that reduce the basic emotions to, or posit that they require, beliefs or other propositional attitudes (for criticism of attempts to reduce desire to belief, see, for example, Lewis 1988, 1996).

A Note about “Cognitivism”

Theories that claim emotions require or are made of beliefs have been, at least in philosophy, called “cognitive” theories of emotions. This is an unfortunate term. in contemporary cognitive science, for example, research-

Search by... Author
Show... All Results Primary Sources Peer-reviewed

Oops!

An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.