In the last two decades, much has been written about caring as an approach to moral life and about care theory as a contribution to ethics. Feminist writers (both women and men) have been strong advocates of caring, tracing its central ideas to women's relational experience and arguing that women and men alike might enjoy richer lives if they shared the tasks and the joys of caring.
The approach I take here reverses a long philosophical tradition. The custom, since Plato, has been to describe an ideal or best state and then to discuss the role of homes and families as supporters of that state. What might we learn if, instead, we start with a description of best homes and then move outward to the larger society? The question is intriguing in itself, but answering it should effectively address an objection that has sometimes been raised against care theory—namely, that it is a fine “domestic” theory but has little to contribute to policy making at the societal level.
Caring, as a moral orientation, is neither domain nor gender specific, but taking this position does not compel us to deny that the origins of care may be domain specific—that they lie in the small group setting that we have come to call “home” and, probably, in parental love. If this is true—if, that is, our sense of caring and being cared for starts at home—then it is reasonable to examine this beginning seriously, to study it philosophically. We can then ask about the social policy implications of care theory and the development of care in individual lives. I believe that school as well as home should be central in any adequate . . .