It is the understandable tendency of the modern student of Roman history to seek there some sort of lesson or practical example. After all, the Romans achieved immense success in certain areas—war, empire building. How did they accomplish these things, we ask? And it is perhaps our uniquely modern tendency to seek the answer to this question not in Roman valor or fortune, as the ancients did, but in the Roman mind; to attribute their success to some superior insight or expertise, some science of war or administration. We would like to see expert strategists tracing defensible borders and buffer zones on the wellplotted topography of Europe and Asia; evaluating the political and military strengths and weaknesses of their enemies; collecting, tracking, and allocating financial resources to meet their strategic goals.
The Roman mind is, in fact, precisely what this study seeks to explore. It asks the question, What were the reasons behind the Roman leadership's most important decisions about foreign war and peace? It has been argued in recent years that the image of the Romans as expert military strategists in the modern sense is illusory, and in general that conclusion is supported in this work. But what, then, were the motivations governing Roman foreign relations? What were the rules of the game at which they were so successful, and what ultimately determined the limits of that success?
The chronological boundaries of this study are roughly the battle of Actium, in 31 b.c., and the fall of Severus Alexander in 235. In choosing them, I do not mean to suggest that the conclusions of this study are . . .