Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind

Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind

Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind

Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind

Synopsis

Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind surveys philosophical issues raised by the situated movement in cognitive science, that is, the treatment of cognitive phenomena as the joint products of brain, body, and environment. The book focuses primarily on the hypothesis of extended cognition, which asserts that human cognitive processes literally comprise elements beyond the boundary of the human organism. Rupert argues that the only plausible way in which to demarcate cognitions is systems-based: cognitive states or processes are the states of the integrated set of mechanisms and capacities that contribute causally and distinctively to the production of cognitive phenomena--for example, language-use, memory, decision-making, theory construction, and, more importantly, the associated forms of behavior. Rupert argues that this integrated system is most likely to appear within the boundaries of the human organism. He argues that the systems-based view explains the existing successes of cognitive psychology and cognate fields in a way that extended conceptions of cognition do not, and that once the systems-based view has been adopted, it is especially clear how extant arguments in support of the extended view go wrong. Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind also examines further aspects of the situated program in cognitive science, including the embedded and embodied approaches to cognition. Rupert asks to what extent the plausible incarnations of these situated views depart from orthodox, computational cognitive science. Here, Rupert focuses on the notions of representation and computation, arguing that the embedded and embodied views do not constitute the radical shifts in perspective they are often claimed to be. Rupert also argues that, properly understood, the embodied view does not offer a new role for the body, different in principle from the one presupposed by orthodox cognitive science. "Rupert's book is a good read. It is a sustained, systematic, critical examination of the idea that minds are not simply ensconced inside heads, but extend into both bodies and the world beyond the body.... There is much to admire in this book. It is well-structured and well-written, adopting a self-consciously naturalistic perspective on how to understand the mind -- through our best, even if imperfect, empirical sciences in the domain of cognition. By presenting and critiquing a number of explicit arguments for and against the specific views that Rupert considers, Cognitive Systems advances the field."-- Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews "Rupert's treatment is a state of the art sustained attack on various forms of the 'extended mind hypothesis'. It is rigorous and challenging, and will be of interest to a quite a large audience of researchers (graduates and above) in philosophy and in cognitive science. Rupert studiously avoids the 'straw men' that populate some recent critiques, and raises deep and sympathetic challenges that go to the core of the program." --Andy Clark, Department of Philosophy, University of Edinburgh

Excerpt

This book reacts to the situated movement in cognitive science (Robbins and Aydede 2009), which emphasizes the contribution of the environment and the nonneural body to human thought. In preparing my earliest published paper on the topic (Rupert 1998), I hoped to harness situated views to my own ends: the development of a causal–historical theory of mental representation. That work led to a more general interest in situated cognition, an interest that, during the academic year 2000–2001, dominated my research. At that time I was Visiting Assistant Professor at Texas Tech University (TTU). I stayed on at TTU for four additional years, where this project was nurtured, alongside others, by the unstinting intellectual support of my colleagues Edward Averill and Aaron Meskin. My foremost thanks go to them. Concerning the manuscript itself, I extend special thanks to Kenneth Aizawa and David Chalmers. Ken gave me detailed comments on many of the chapters in parts I and II, and, as series editor, Dave provided helpful advice on all aspects of the project, including content, organization, strategy, and style.

Many others have participated with me in this discussion, in various ways through various media, or have supported the endeavor in some other substantive manner. In this regard, I would like to thank Fred Adams, Colin Allen, Michael L. Anderson, Murat Aydede, David B. Barnett, Len Boonin, Sara Rachel Chant, Andy Clark, Jonathan Cohen, Robert Cummins, Howard Curzer, Nic Damjanovic, Carl Gillett, Bob Hanna, Chris Heathwood, David Hilbert, Bryce Huebner, Susan Hurley, Dan Kaufman, Sungsu Kim, Walter Kintsch, Colin Klein, Douglas Kutach, Clayton Lewis, David Lindy, Joseph Long . . .

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