The Uses and Limits of Small-Scale Military Interventions

The Uses and Limits of Small-Scale Military Interventions

The Uses and Limits of Small-Scale Military Interventions

The Uses and Limits of Small-Scale Military Interventions

Excerpt

This monograph documents the results of a project entitled “Minimalist Stabilization.” The project aimed to assess the utility and limitations of small-scale interventions in ongoing conflicts and to propose policy recommendations concerning the circumstances under which minimalist stabilization missions may be appropriate and the strategies most likely to make such interventions successful, as well as the implications for U.S. Army force structure debates and partnership strategies.

The monograph is written for a general audience, although it is likely to be of particular interest to those in the defense analytical community, both civilian and military, concerned with stability operations, counterinsurgency, and security force assistance.

This study is a product of the RAND Corporation’s continuing program of self-initiated independent research. Support for such research is provided, in part, by donors and by the independent research and development provisions of RAND’s contracts for the operation of its U.S. Department of Defense federally funded research and development centers. This research was conducted within the RAND Arroyo Center’s Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Corporation, is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the United States Army.

For comments or further information, please contact the project leader, Stephen Watts (telephone 703-413-1100, extension 5174, email swatts@rand.org).

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