Feminist Phenomenology Futures

Feminist Phenomenology Futures

Feminist Phenomenology Futures

Feminist Phenomenology Futures

Synopsis

Distinguished feminist philosophers consider the future of their field and chart its political and ethical course in this forward-looking volume. Engaging with themes such as the historical trajectory of feminist phenomenology, ways of perceiving and making sense of the contemporary world, and the feminist body in health and ethics, these essays affirm the base of the discipline as well as open new theoretical spaces for work that bridges bioethics, social identity, physical ability, and the very nature and boundaries of the female body. Entanglements with thinkers such as Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Beauvoir, and Arendt are evident and reveal new directions for productive philosophical work. Grounded in the richness of the feminist philosophical tradition, this work represents a significant opening to the possible futures of feminist phenomenological research.

Excerpt

Dorothea E. olkowski and helen A. fielding

The future is now

“The future is now.” Google this phrase and you might be surprised to see at least 854 million results, many of which seem to announce advances in technology, although there are some song titles high in the rankings. Yet in scrolling through them, it appears that none of the results define or explain what this phrase means. the philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach did not address the future as now, but he did write about “the philosophy of the future” in a critique of G.W.F. Hegel that proposes to look at being, not as an abstraction, but as sensuous, a being involved in sense perception, feeling, and love. What truly exists, Feuerbach claims, must be able to be loved, and the laws of reality must also be the laws of thought. Addressing Karl Marx’s later critique of Feuerbach, Maurice Merleau-Ponty picks up on Feuerbach’s project in his lecture course “Philosophy and Non-Philosophy since Hegel.” Merleau-Ponty expands the discourse on the future to the future that is now, arguing that the concepts of subjectivity and objectivity must be recast in relation to their contact with our life. This is because when philosophy is not detached from life, there can be a transfiguration that is “another love,” “‘a new happiness.’”

In this light, the essays in part 1 of this book invoke the future but also the joyfulness and love a philosophy of the future bears. But that is not all, because although there is the sense that when such a future philosophy arrives, it arrives joyfully as a celebration and as happiness, perhaps it also arrives as a sort of revolutionary fervor. Merleau-Ponty’s view of this fervor is that “one can only validly think what one has in some way lived, the rest being nothing but imagination.”

Search by... Author
Show... All Results Primary Sources Peer-reviewed

Oops!

An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.