Psychology and Logic - Vol. 1

Psychology and Logic - Vol. 1

Psychology and Logic - Vol. 1

Psychology and Logic - Vol. 1

Excerpt

Two basic theses underly the present work.

The first, the specificity theorem, signifies that logic is essentially concerned with specific events and not with universal and transcendent systems.

The second, the interbehavioral theorem, implies that no matter how logic is defined it entails a psychological dimension which must be taken into account. Even those logicians who postulate that there are invariant relations in the universe or ultimate uniformities of nature inevitably face the investigative problem of how they are discovered. Since the various traditional psychological systems have not proved satisfactory in handling such problems and since the interbehavioral event and its product are always implied, an interbehavioral psychology is highly desirable.

The Specificity Thesis. The writer holds that the referents for the term logic are always individual human enterprises located in particular fields or frames of reference. Since these enterprises are constructive they comprise (1) actions or performances, (2) materials worked with, and (3) results or products.

Though writers on logic differ in their views concerning the nature of logic, and produce treatises varying widely in scope, content, and principle, they all agree that they are seeking the one true or valid system. Rarely is it suggested that no such universal system is available.

Glance at a telling example. When Locke made his famous declaration that "God has not been so sparing to men to make them barely two-legged creatures, and left it to Aristotle to make them rational," it is plain that he was merely attempting to dissociate logical action which he called reasoning from formal syllogizing. Yet Joseph accuses Locke of bringing objections against the study . . .

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