Foundations of Knowledge, in Three Parts

Foundations of Knowledge, in Three Parts

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Foundations of Knowledge, in Three Parts

Foundations of Knowledge, in Three Parts

Read FREE!

Excerpt

It is not the aim of this preface to relieve the body of the work of the responsibility of making itself clear. Nevertheless there are two or three topics on which a preliminary observation or two may not be amiss. In the first place, it scarcely needs saying that the work is meant as a first rather than a final word on the topics with which it deals. Completeness has not, therefore, been one of its aims. This should be borne in mind in making out the list of sins of omission and commission of which the author is to be held guilty. Again, while the work aims to be broadly experiential in the sense that the notion of experience is to be regarded as all-comprehensive, yet the application to it of the term empirical in any narrow or partizan sense may fairly be resented. For as regards the ordinary issues between empiricism and rationalism or intuitionism, they are simply transcended by the inclusion of reason and intuition among the functions of experience; for it is clear that experience cannot dispense with intuition, and it is no less obvious that the supreme intra-experiential test is that of rationality.

One of the points of theory insisted on as cardinal is the place assigned to the notion and function of experience. That knowledge is an intra-experiential term and that philosophy must be an interpretation of experience in the broad sense, are taken to be propositions that are not open . . .

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