Theories of Coalition Formation

Theories of Coalition Formation

Theories of Coalition Formation

Theories of Coalition Formation

Excerpt

In this book, we set forth the central ideas and results of the major theories of coalition forming behavior. These theories address situations of partial conflict of interest with the following aspects: (1) there are three or more players, (2) players may openly communicate with each other, and (3) players form coalitions by freely negotiating agreements on how to disburse the gains that result from the coalition members' joint coordinated efforts. In this investigation, we limit ourselves to models in which the players' identities are freely interchangeable; that is, no considerations of political affinity, ideological similarity, or attitudinal proximity are considered. These models arise from the two disciplines of mathematics, in the theory of cooperative n-person games with sidepayments, and social psychology, in theories of small group behavior in mixed-motive situations.

Our goal is to explore the various solution concepts that make up this body of theory, and in particular to examine the psychological premises that underlie the various theoretical models. We draw this body of theory together in a structure that illuminates the foundational similarities and differences among the various models presented, in a manner that we hope makes the mathematical models accessible to the reader who may not be comfortable reading the books and journals where much of the material first appeared. We hope this examination will enhance readers' appreciation for the appropriateness of game theoretic and other formal mathematical models to the behavioral sciences and that it will clarify the relationship between game theoretic and social psychological models of coalition forming behavior.

In writing this book, we have been guided by the book written by R. D. Luce and H. Raiffa, Games and Decisions, which so lucidly presented the central . . .

Search by... Author
Show... All Results Primary Sources Peer-reviewed

Oops!

An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.