Waging Peace offers the first fully comprehensive study of Eisenhower's "New Look" program of national security, which provided the groundwork for the next three decades of America's Cold War strategy. Though the Cold War itself and the idea of containment originated under Truman, it was left to Eisenhower to develop the first coherent and sustainable strategy for addressing the issues unique to the nuclear age. To this end, he designated a decision-making system centered around the National Security Council to take full advantage of the expertise and data from various departments and agencies and of the judgment of his principal advisors. The result was the formation of a "long haul" strategy of preventing war and Soviet expansion and of mitigating Soviet hostility. Only now, in the aftermath of the Cold War, can Eisenhower's achievement be fully appreciated. This book will be of much interest to scholars and students of the Eisenhower era, diplomatic history, the Cold War, and contemporary foreign policy.

General Andrew L. Goodpaster U.S. Army, Ret.

In our country, each presidential administration has a character of its own, and the Eisenhower administration was no exception. It bore the imprint--both direct and indirect--of Eisenhower himself. Its character was well displayed, in its broader outlines, by what was reported to the public at the time, but in later years it has been disclosed more fully and more deeply as records, interviews, and historical accounts give added insight and greater detail as to just how the major issues were handled, and how the major policies were pursued.

In this book, the reader will see Eisenhower in action, and is likely to come away with a quite different perception from what may previously have been held concerning his leadership. The reader will also be given a deeper understanding as to what the significance of the Eisenhower administration really was in terms of America's security and cold war strategy.

One key early finding, foreshadowed in Eisenhower's service as commander of NATO in 1951 and 1952, was that the National Security Council document NSC 68, a legacy of the Truman administration, would not be sustainable on a long-term basis as the foundation for American security and military planning. As a result, Eisenhower devoted himself as a top priority to the development of policy and doctrine for dealing with the realities of security that would be sustainable. In this process his views and conceptions were of central importance.

The authors of this volume make contributions of unique value. Each brings his own set of special qualifications to their combined task: Robert Bowie served as head of the State Department Planning Staff and senior advisor and assistant to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and he was the State member of the NSC Planning Board; Richard Immerman, through his background of previous scholarly work on both Eisenhower and Dulles, has equipped himself well for his part in this endeavor.

The circumstances with which Eisenhower and his administration had to deal on coming into office were dangerous and demanding. The war in Korea needed to . . .