Antitrust Policy and Interest-Group Politics


This is the first study to apply the interest-group model of regulation to the study of antitrust law and policy. The application of this model enables the author to both identify important trends in the antitrust arena and demonstrate which groups have benefited most from antitrust legislation. Divided into three sections, the first provides an overview of antitrust law and policy, the second explores the various private interests that impinge on antitrust policy, and finally, Shugart examines the political economy of antitrust. His analysis clearly shows that the antitrust legislation of the last few decades has tended to benefit well organized private interest groups more than consumers.

Additional information

Publisher: Place of publication:
  • New York
Publication year:
  • 1990


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