This book achieves a goal that was set 25 years ago when Anderson and Bower (1973) published the ham theory of human memory. That theory reflected one of a number of then current efforts to create a theory of human cognition that met the twin goals of precision and complexity. Until that time, the standard for precision had been the mathematical theories of the 1950s and 1960s. These theories took the form of precise models of specific experiments along with some informal verbally stated understanding of how they could be extended to new experiments. They seemed to fall far short of capturing the breadth and power of human cognition that was being demonstrated by the new experimental work in human cognition.
Ham represented an effort to create a computer simulation system that overcame the shortcomings of this earlier generation of mathematical models. These computer simulation systems were efforts to create computationally powerful models of human cognition that actually performed a wide range of tasks. Performing simulations instead of formal analyses offered the promise of dealing with complexity without sacrificing precision. Like other initial efforts of the time, ham fell short of the aspirations set for it. First, it was only a theory of human memory and so failed to address many critical phenomena in human cognition. Second, although there was a running program, the sense in which it actually performed the tasks in question was weak. There was a lot of accompanying verbal theory to explain how it really applied to many tasks and in many cases it just became a mathematical model.
The next 10 years saw two major efforts on our part to address the problems of scope. in 1976, the act theory (Anderson, 1976) was first described. It included a production rule system of procedural memory to complement HAM's declarative memory. This provided a computationally adequate system that was indeed capable of accounting for all sorts of cognition. in 1983, Anderson published the ACT system, which extended . . .