Moral Education: Theory and Application

Moral Education: Theory and Application

Moral Education: Theory and Application

Moral Education: Theory and Application

Excerpt

If one were to take a poll asking people whether they would vote for or against morality, one would expect a rather overwhelming endorsement. There is little disagreement that people should behave morally, should respect moral rules and should be concerned about justice and responsibility. There is, however, a great deal of disagreement about what constitutes morality and how it can be stimulated in an individual and/or social group. This is specially noticeable in theoretical, practical and empirical approaches to moral education.

Perhaps the historically most volatile issue in moral education has centered about what the content of such training should be. Should it be based upon prevailing political trends? Should it be based upon loyalty to some other social frame of reference, e. g., a religion or an economic organization? Should it be based on forms of retribution? This controversy was rendered obsolete with the advent of moral education based upon Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral reasoning development. Moshe Blatt's (Blatt &Kohlberg, 1975) pioneering attempts at bringing developmental theory to the classroom formed the basis for Kohlberg's argument that moral education should be free of the content controversy by orienting instead to the natural progression of stages of reasoning development that themselves are not tied to any particular moral content but rather to progressively more adequate forms of moral problem solving. Such a conception attracted claims of relativism and irresponsibility, but Kohlberg and his colleagues have amply demonstrated that (1) his model is diametrically incompatible with a relativist stance while (2) also avoiding the problems that plague indoctrinative moral education (Kohlberg &Mayer, 1972). The sequence of development is fixed and universal, and although content is correlated to particular stages, that relationship is indirect and imperfect. It is the individual . . .

Author Advanced search

Oops!

An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.