The purpose of this book is to provide students in economics, government, and business administration with an opportunity to obtain a clear understanding of our antitrust laws. Teachers in these fields are almost uniform in their agreement that there is no substitute for an actual reading of the case material, in order to facilitate an understanding of the legal and economic issues raised by our antitrust laws, and to provide the student with concrete "real-world" problems which by their very nature are the most interesting. However, students can rarely be required to read lengthy court opinions in addition to a standard text. Consequently, I undertook the task of compiling a list of the leading decisions in this area, and of editing them to manageable proportions, taking care, at the same time, to preserve all that is of lasting significance in the opinions. In every instance the original language of the court has been retained; and the deletions made were not permitted to interfere with the smooth flow of thought and language of these judicial opinions.
A word about the selection of cases is, I believe, in order. Only those which represent truly landmark opinions have been included. An attempt has been made to select cases so that the student will have both an understanding of the law as it now stands, and a knowledge of the historical development of the attitude of the courts on the various legal-economic issues. Furthermore, although each section of the book is self-contained in the sense that it covers an issue or problem in its entirety, the various sections are definitely interrelated. Thus, for example, the first section provides a rather thorough treatment of court attiudes towards monopoly, while the second section deals with the legal and economic issues raised by direct price-fixing agreements. The cases in these portions of the book were also selected so that the student might easily compare court attitudes towards proprietary consolidations and monopoly, on the one hand, and loose-knit confederations on the other. In this way the concept of the "double standard" in federal antitrust is made more readily understandable.
Although final responsibility for the selection of cases remains my own, I would like to thank Joel Dirlam, of the University of Connecticut, Alfred E. Kahn of Cornell University, George W. Stocking of Vanderbilt University, and Simon N. Whitney of the Twentieth Century Fund for their many helpful suggestions. Others whose advice I would like to acknowledge include M. A. Adelman of Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Aaron Director of the University of Chicago; Jesse W. Markham of Princeton University; Clair Wilcox of Swarthmore College; and William V. Wilmot, Jr. of the University of Wisconsin. Last, but far . . .