Epistemology; Or, the Theory of Knowledge; An Introduction to General Metaphysics - Vol. 2

Epistemology; Or, the Theory of Knowledge; An Introduction to General Metaphysics - Vol. 2

Epistemology; Or, the Theory of Knowledge; An Introduction to General Metaphysics - Vol. 2

Epistemology; Or, the Theory of Knowledge; An Introduction to General Metaphysics - Vol. 2

Excerpt

95. TRANSITION TO SENSE PERCEPTION. TERMS AND DISTINCTIONS.--When examining the terms and data of our general inquiry in the opening chapter, we distinguished (8) between knowledge proper and mere consciousness; between reflex consciousness and the implicit, concomitant awareness which the conscious subject necessarily has of itself in all its conscious states or activities, without which these could not be conscious, and which is usually described as direct consciousness; between non-cognitive (volitional, emotional, etc.) and cognitive consciousness; between the interpretative objectivity of those cognitive states of consciousness which fall short of judgment, and the formal or consciously asserted objectivity of the judgment itself. We have also been obliged, in our exposition of the doctrines of Descartes, Kant and Scholasticism (77), to discuss at some length the nature and validity of our awareness of the self as a concrete, existing, individual reality. Presupposing what has been said already in those connexions we may be brief in our present exposition of the cognitive value or significance of the facts of consciousness and memory,--an exposition which will serve as a necessary and natural transition from intellectual knowledge to sense knowledge.

The psychological distinction between intellectual consciousness, whereby we are aware of our intellectual activities such as thought and volition,--and sense consciousness, whereby we are aware of our external sense functions and the states and conditions of our bodies,--is not itself a datum of consciousness, but an inference arising from introspection and based on the . . .

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