Time Runs out in Cbi
Time Runs out in Cbi
The history of China, Burma, and India, as U.S. theaters of operations in World War II, ended as it began. As in 1942, so in 1945 the Americans in China were still attempting to improve the Chinese Army so that China might be a more effective partner in the United Nations war against Japan. Other Americans in India and Burma were making an effort to fly supplies to their American and Chinese comrades and to help drive the Japanese from North Burma so that still more supplies might go to China by road and pipeline.
The volume begins with the division of the China-Burma-India Theater into the India-Burma and China Theaters in October 1944 and ends with a Japanese surrender that cut across the accelerating Sino-American preparations in China. The scope of this subseries has required covering both of the successor theaters of CBI in a single volume. Though an effort has been made to do justice to the India-Burma Theater, its mission of supporting the China Theater dictated subordinating the account of its activities to the story of the latter theater. Perhaps the most significant story told in this volume describes the efforts of Lt. Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer and his staff to create an effective system for Sino-American co-operation in building a better Chinese Army.
This volume is the last of a three-volume subseries that describes a continuing flow of events and the space given to the several topics treated within reflects that fact. The authors have tried to make the volume reasonably complete within itself, yet the perspective in which events have appeared to them will emerge more clearly if viewed in the light of the first two volumes.
Like its predecessors, the present volume is written at the level of theater headquarters in the India-Burma and China Theaters. The emphasis is on the over-all roles of the organizations comprised in the Army Ground Forces and the Army Service Forces. The authors have not attempted to duplicate the efforts of the U.S. Air Force in presenting its own story of air operations in China, Burma, and India, or of the several technical services in telling their histories. Moreover, the other nations that took part in the closing phases of World War II in the Pacific must perforce be left to tell their own stories from their own records.