The Future's Back: Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory, and Crisis Stability after the Cold War

The Future's Back: Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory, and Crisis Stability after the Cold War

The Future's Back: Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory, and Crisis Stability after the Cold War

The Future's Back: Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory, and Crisis Stability after the Cold War

Synopsis

Arguing that previous critiques of rational choice and deterrence theory are not convincing, Frank Harvey constructs a new set of empirical tests of rational deterrence theory to illuminate patterns of interaction between rival nuclear powers. He analyses the crisis management techniques used by the United States and the Soviet Union in twenty-eight post-war crises and isolates factors that promote or inhibit escalation of these crises. This "crises"-based data set serves as the basis for identifying patterns of response when one nuclear state is threatened by another. The Future's Back offers new directions for testing that emphasize a more unified approach to theory building and assesses the feasibility of alternative courses of action to prevent escalation of future disputes characterized by nuclear rivalry.
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