A Philosophy of Science for Personality Theory

A Philosophy of Science for Personality Theory

A Philosophy of Science for Personality Theory

A Philosophy of Science for Personality Theory

Excerpt

We would now do well to define some important terms which will be taken up in greater detail in Chapters III and IV. We have already used these terms but now want to see them more clearly phrased, and in closer proximity. The construct of theory will be considered first.

A theory may be thought of as a series of two or more constructions (abstractions), which have been hypothesized, assumed, or even factually demonstrated to bear a certain relationship, one with the other. A theoretical proposition, which defines the relationship between constructions (now termed "variables"), becomes a fact when that proposition is no longer contested by those individuals best informed on the nature of the theory, and dedicated to study in the area of knowledge for which the theory has relevance. Theories vary in their levels of abstraction, objectivity- subjectivity, realism-idealism, perspective, and formality-informality.

This is a very liberal definition, one which basically equates theorizing with thinking. It suggests that one can never escape the influence of some kind of theory, and therefore that the role of theory -- its function in knowledge -- is worthy of study in its own right. Theoretical propositions have various levels of meaning, so we must consider another term:

By the meaning of a theoretical construct or proposition we recognize the relation(s) it bears to a host of other constructs which have been clearly proposed, vaguely analogized, or factually . . .

Search by... Author
Show... All Results Primary Sources Peer-reviewed

Oops!

An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.