The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine: The US, Britain and Nasser's Egypt, 1953-57

The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine: The US, Britain and Nasser's Egypt, 1953-57

The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine: The US, Britain and Nasser's Egypt, 1953-57

The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine: The US, Britain and Nasser's Egypt, 1953-57

Excerpt

This book explores the relationship between the United States and Egypt from 1953 to 1957. In the 1950s, the Middle East saw a unique interplay among policies, commitments, and conflicts, including American Cold War strategies, local pressures for self-determination, Soviet plans for expansion, the remnants of British colonialism and the apparently intractable Arab-Israeli conflict. All of these elements played a role in the United States' policy as it sought to secure the support of nationalist forces in the region in its struggle against the Soviet Union.

The American policy toward the Middle East must be viewed in the context of Cold War rivalry, in which the Eisenhower administration sought to incorporate the Arab world in its global alliance network. In pursuit of this aim, the American policy-makers recognized the potency of regional nationalism and the importance of Egypt in determining the direction of Arab politics. Accordingly, the Eisenhower administration sought to guide the Egyptian regime along lines conducive to its Cold War objectives.

However, the focal point of Egypt's policy was domination of the Middle East through lessening the impact of outside powers. To achieve its aspirations, Cairo sought to exploit the Arab nationalist sentiments that pervaded the region. By the 1950s, Egypt's historical leadership of the Arab world allowed Gamal Abdul Nasser to effectively claim Arab nationalism and utilize it as an instrument of Egypt's area hegemony. Thus, while the American policy-makers hoped to employ Egypt's influence as a barrier to Soviet subversion, Cairo sought to eliminate external influences and mobilize Arab resources behind its drive for regional leadership. The inherent conflict between a superpower focused on curbing Soviet moves and a local regime preoccupied with regional challenges eventually caused a breakdown in US-Egyptian relations.

The other facet of this study is assessment of Anglo-American relations and the role that Britain played in the Eisenhower administration's conception of Middle East security. Much of the literature on Anglo-American relations in this period is constructed through the prism of the Suez Crisis, and professes an American determination to replace the problematic British establishment. This study suggests that . . .

Author Advanced search

Oops!

An unknown error has occurred. Please click the button below to reload the page. If the problem persists, please try again in a little while.