Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

The Philosophical Review: Vol. 111, No. 2, April 2002

Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

The Philosophical Review: Vol. 111, No. 2, April 2002

Article excerpt

Reply to Huemer on the Consequence Argument, HELEN BEEBEE

In a recent paper ("Van Inwagen's Consequence Argument," Philosophical Review 109 (2000): 525 44), Michael Huemer defends a version of the Consequence Argument. Part of his defense involves the claim that Lewis-style compatibilism is committed to denying a premise in that argument--the premise that we cannot do anything about the past--and arguing that that denial is absurd. The author argues that Huemer fails to distinguish between the past relative to now and the past relative to the time of the act to be performed. He thus attributes to Lewis the thesis that "I am now able to do something about the past relative to now," when in fact Lewis is only committed to the thesis that "I am now able to do something about the past relative to the time of the (future) act." Since it is the former thesis that generates the absurdity, Huemer fails to meet a Lewis-style response to the Consequence Argument.

Assertion, Knowledge, and Context, KEITH DEROSE

The Formal-Structural View of Logical Consequence: A Reply to Gila Sher, WILLIAM H. HANSON

This paper deals mainly with two issues in the philosophy of logic: (a) whether it can be shown that all arguments which are valid according to the formal-structural view are necessarily truth preserving in virtue of form, and (b) the bearing of the formal-structural view on the question of whether, and in what sense, logic is nonempirical. …

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