Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

Philosophy: Vol. 78, No. 3, July 2003

Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

Philosophy: Vol. 78, No. 3, July 2003

Article excerpt

Identity, Individuality, and Unity, E. J. LOWE

Locke notoriously included number among the primary qualities of bodies and was roundly criticized by Berkeley for doing so. Frege echoed some of Berkeley's criticisms in attacking the idea that number is a property of external things, while defending his own view that number is a property of concepts. In the present paper, Locke's view is defended against the objection of Berkeley and Frege, and Frege's alternative view of number is criticized More precisely, it is argued that numbers are assignable to pluralities of individuals. However, it is also argued that Locke went too far in asserting that "Number applies itself to ... everything that either doth exist, or can be imagined."

Williams on Ethics, Knowledge, and Reflection, A. W. MOORE

The author begins with an outline of Bernard Williams's moral philosophy, within which he locates Williams's notorious doctrine that reflection can destroy ethical knowledge. He then gives a partial defense of this doctrine, exploiting an analogy between ethical judgments and tensed judgments. The basic idea is that what the passage of time does for the latter, reflection can do for the former: namely, prevent the readoption of an abandoned point of view (an ethical point of view in the one case, a temporal point of view in the other). In the final section the author says a little about how reflection might do this. …

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