Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

The Philosophical Quarterly: Vol. 54, No. 217, October 2004

Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

The Philosophical Quarterly: Vol. 54, No. 217, October 2004

Article excerpt

Minimalism and the Value of Truth, MICHAEL P. LYNCH

Minimalists generally see themselves as engaged in a descriptive project. They maintain that they can explain everything we want to say about truth without appealing to anything other than the T-schema, that is, the idea that the proposition that p is true i.p. This paper argues that despite recent claims to the contrary, minimalists cannot explain one important belief many people have about truth, namely, that truth is good. If that is so, then minirealism, and possibly deflationism as a whole, must be rejected or recast as a profoundly revisionary project.

Relativity of Value and the Consequentialist Umbrella, JENNIE LOUSIE

Does the real difference between noneonsequentialist and consequentialist theories lie in their approach to value? Nonconsequentialist theories are thought either to allow a different kind of value (namely, agent-relative value) or to advocate a different response to value ("honoring" rather than "promoting"). One objection to this idea implies that all normative theories are describable as consequentialist. But then the distinction between honoring and promoting collapses into the distinction between relative and neutral value. A proper description of nonconsequentialist theories can only be achieved by including a distinction between temporal relativity and neutrality in addition to the distinction between agent-relativity and agent-neutrality. …

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