After the deployment of three ambitious and powerfully organized peace support forces to Cambodia, Somalia, and former Yugoslavia, the United Nations has crossed the threshold into a new chapter of operations. The characteristics and needs of these contingencies are still unclear. Success has also been elusive, and without an overall concept that has been operationally validated, each force has developed in its own idiosyncratic manner. As a result, a race to develop and promulgate a new concept of operations has begun among the NATO armies. Training and doctrine staff of the U.S. Army are now addressing these contingencies with some urgency. In common with other NATO army staffs, their task is to find a concept of operations to interpret these unfamiliar scenarios to future contingent commanders. But in some aspects their learning curve will be steeper, because for three decades the U.S. armed forces have distanced themselves from UN peace operations. Now that they are joining the peacekeepers club, what problems does this raise for them and for the older members?
Circumstances of U.S. Forces Deployment
The first priority has been to understand as accurately as possible the contingencies to which the administration would be prepared to deploy U.S. forces. In a 1993 address to the National War College, U.S. Ambassador to the UN Madeleine Albright said that the following concerns would have to be answered satisfactorily before U.S. military forces could become involved in future UN multinational operations:
* Seriousness of the threat to international peace and security
* A clear definition of the mission and parameters for the proposed operation
* Consent of parties involved on the ground
* Effectiveness of the cease-fire between parties
* Availability of sufficient finances and resources to achieve the mission
* Finite nature of the UN's duration in the host nation.
She also stipulated that the administration was unwilling to hazard the lives of young men and women on missions that were badly planned, unprofessionally executed, and without competent commanders. She stressed the Clinton administration would choose the means to implement these responses case by case. (1)
These conditions are well stated and amount to what any caring government should regard as sine qua non for involvement of a national contingent in a UN operation. However, recent case history of UN operations in former Yugoslavia, Cambodia, and Somalia indicates that in reality, the U.S. Government, in common with other contributors, is more likely to find itself submitting a national contingent as part of a UN force operating in areas where no peace agreement has been successfully negotiated; locally, consent to a UN presence is in doubt; and there is no clearly defined military mission or end state for the UN involvement.
However desirable, the Albright manifesto may be making assumptions about the standard and the orderly nature of UN operations that, institutionally, the United Nations will be unable to deliver for some years to come. It is also possible that a future situation may arise that is internationally so intolerable or morally so abhorrent that the administration, far from coolly appraising each contingency case by case, is thrust into a situation as the result of mounting pressure from the domestic constituency to "do something"--against the professional judgment of its military advisors and contrary to its own preconditions.
Although the UN institutional capability to plan and direct multinational military operations has not significantly improved, its post-Cold War contingencies have become increasingly complex and hazardous. In their unpublished manuals currently under draft, British and American doctrine writers have acknowledged that future UN forces face a new dimension of operations in which the most likely and challenging tasks amount to something more than peacekeeping but fall short of enforcement by all possible means. (2) In this category there may be no agreed peace process, and local support for UN intervention may not be universal. Although some traditionalists argue that the United Nations should not intervene under these circumstances, there may be situations where there is overwhelming international pressure for an intervention coupled with assurances from the majority of warring factions in the host country that they will support, and submit their armed elements to a UN peace process. If a UN force is deployed in these circumstances and then finds locally that a tiny minority of fighters have refused to cooperate in the process and are subverting the local population away from UN objectives by using terror and coercion, it must act to protect threatened civilian minorities.
The role of the military in this case involves providing a reassuring security presence and a reserve with a quick reaction capability to restore a situation. During multiparty cease-fires and the cantonment procedures that should follow, military tasks will be intensive and central to the whole success of the UN plan. But after the conflict has stabilized, in the period of civil restoration, their role is subordinated to the political and civil elements of the overall peace strategy. The UN military contingents are still crucial to the success of the process; it they allow the security of these civilian-led programs to become threatened, the whole strategy will fail. Their role must be coordinated within the overall process of a multifunctional solution. In this mode their tasks include support and protection of the activities of the other UN elements so that elections can be held, relief continues to be delivered, disarmed fighters return safely to their villages, and the reins of power are gently but firmly removed from the grasp of local war lords and passed over to a lawfully elected government.
Whether a U.S. military contingent deployed in this scenario is submitted to the command of an integrated UN multinational HQ, or remains a distinct element commanded from an offshore US national HQ, the operational problems and conditions on the ground will remain the same in both cases. Its tasks, provisionally listed in the recent U.S. Army draft FM 100 23 (version 4), may include:
* Maintenance and restoration of order in civil disturbances
* Preventive deployment to forestall violence between communities or states
* Provision and protection of humanitarian assistance efforts
* Guarantee and denial of movement
* Enforcement of sanctions
* Establishment of protective zones
* Forcible separation of belligerents
A Concept for Success
Although success, in terms of the targets stipulated in their agreed mandates, has so far eluded the significantly larger UN forces deployed since the end of the Cold War, it is still possible to identify some of the essential criteria for a favorable outcome.
Need for Civilian Support
Recent experience has shown the importance of maintaining civilian support, and that UN elements need continued goodwill to function from day to day. The deployment of small, vulnerable groups of newly arrived foreigners into a conflict zone raises obvious problems, particularly of personal security. With common sense and sound local information it may be possible to avoid known hazards such as minefields and no-go areas dominated by hostile fighters. A close relationship between UN commanders and surrounding local authorities is essential for the effective distribution of relief, the protection of aid workers, and the maintenance of an acceptable level of individual security. Their involvement in the planning of long-term activities such as rehabilitation and the organization of elections is essential. If the United Nations becomes alienated locally from the population there may be a number of serious consequences. Movement of convoys and individuals becomes hazardous through lack of information; looting and banditry against foreigners may increase and information withheld concerning the perpetrators, but above all the achievement of a long-term peace process becomes almost impossible. In this way the withdrawal of local civilian support can lead to the defeat of a peace process.
Disaffection on this scale is caused not only by inherent problems of an intervention by culturally unacceptable foreign troops, but also by planned subversion. Techniques to mobilize popular opinion to overturn a government or, in this case, to turn them against a UN presence or peace process are found in doctrines of counterinsurgency dating back to Mao Tse Tung. The function of encouraging the civil population to support the process of restoration in "new era" peace support operations, which distinguishes them from traditional peacekeeping, has become a crucial factor of success. Unless the mandate for intervention has the unqualified consent of every armed gang in the involved state, a local UN commander or official is likely to face subversion, and therefore confrontation, of some kind.
UN forces now have diverse range of tasks and consequently are multifunctionally organized to address four main functional areas:
* Continue negotiating
* Provide relief
* Restore the civil administration of the host nation
* Maintain security.
Although the functional elements have separate roles, implicitly at a strategic level, all have the same long-term objectives. The orchestration of these diverse activities has proved to be extremely complex and there are many reasons why a multinational/multi-agency UN force is particularly unsuited for this type of operation.
In previous UN experience, maintaining interagency cohesion was not crucially important, especially for buffer-zone forces; now it is essential for success. A multifunctional UN force that must achieve a lasting cease-fire and help recreate a viable political system requires the full support of all elements. In many cases the problems will be civil and political and cannot be solved by purely military means. In particular the aid agencies, cooperating closely with the UN military, may take a leading role in the rehabilitation of disarmed fighters, For example, in Cambodia, although there was an agreed rehabilitation process, execution relied on several functional elements acting together. Thousands of returnees from the refugee camps in Thailand needed secure movement arrangements and above all a safe home free from mines and violence, for their resettlement. This needed a demining and disarmament program that ran in synchronization with the resettlement plan.
Coordination across the elements of the force would be easier if UN structures and procedures existed for that purpose. However, so far in every force the staff has had to improvise agreements and ad hoc meetings to bring together the strands of different activities into a single strategy with a common purpose. The plan thus achieved is then reinterpreted at a lower level in each district by a similarly convened group representing the essential elements of the force. It is important to have a district level structure for coordination because some administrative districts cover huge areas and are isolated. But in many cases district coordination is poorly conducted. Often there is no obvious appointee to be director of operations at district level; civil agencies resent a military director and vice-versa.
Assessment of Operational Viability
Although a UN intervention not underwritten by a strong moral and legal rationale may fail through lack of international support, it does not follow that a UN intervention that has all these factors weighing behind it will necessarily succeed. Even when international pressure to do something is very intense, success will hinge on the practicability of the operation, and usually this factor will be the subject of a military judgment regarding the balance of armed forces. To succeed, the sum of the military power of the intervening force (IF), the warring factions (WF), and the civilian population (CIVPOP) supporting the peace process must greatly exceed the sum of the opposed elements in the host nation (figure 1).
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
In Operations Desert Storm and Just Cause, the relative power and capability of the IF was very much greater than shown in the example above, completely overwhelming all other military and civil parties in the conflict area, making it irrelevant whether the latter resisted or supported the intervention. For a limited period it was possible for both IFs to militarily subjugate their respective areas and dictate solutions. But in succeeding UN operations, UNTAC, UNPROFOR, and UNOSOM 2, the IF was much smaller, so it was crucially important that a substantial element of the WF and CIVPOP actively support the peace process.
In a UN organized intervention, once an international consensus has been achieved, the judgment to decide its viability still rests initially on a military assessment of comparative strengths. The comparatively smaller and militarily weaker UN forces, such as intervened to assist in Cambodia, Somalia, and former Yugoslavia, require that a substantial element of the warring factions will support them, if they are to carry out the tasks stipulated in the mandate. However, this apparently simple matter of counting bayonets is vastly complicated when the behaviors of the civil population also have to be predicted for the duration of the intervention. It is quite possible that an intervention, militarily viable because the balance of armed forces is highly favorable to the intervention force, may fail if the tiny schism of fighters ("against" in figure 1) continues to oppose the process and successfully subverts a sizable element of civil population to its side.
This possibility, already demonstrated in Mogadishu and to a lesser extent in Cambodia, introduces an essential condition for success that has not yet been fully understood by UN officials or in some cases by the military staffs and contingents involved. UN forces now face the prospect of having to win over and maintain the support of an uncommitted civilian population. If they fail, not only will their immediate operational environment become hazardous but the whole success of what might otherwise be a viable peace support operation will be jeopardized. In a confrontation the UN troops are faced with a dilemma: to succeed they will have to protect local people from subversion, especially unlawful terrorist attacks, but at the same time individual contingents have to make themselves culturally acceptable. Overreaction and the use of force in an undiscriminating manner may alienate local people and serve the subversives.
Foreign affairs officials who advise U.S. and European governments on UN policy have for some time fostered the misconception that UN peace support operations will only involve token military activities. This was true of the interpositional forces of the Cold War period, but experience has demonstrated that the larger, recently deployed forces need to be militarily effective and locally are required to be proactive when, for example, they are called on the restore security and order. Furthermore, prior to the current UK and U.S. efforts to develop a concept for land operations, many officers were unable to see that military action to restore security or protect relief operations was not something that could be done simply by force of arms. It required force to be used judiciously and implicitly, rather than in a gun-pointing manner that tended to lead swiftly on to the use of explicit force. Above all, contrary to the unofficial but widely held view among UN officials in New York, it requires a very high standard of infantry soldier to execute these missions effectively if they are going to be done with the minimum of violence. These ideas are now more widely accepted and better understood by policy makers. It is for these mid-level contingencies, and not to garrison an interpositional buffer zone, that the U.S. armed forces must now prepare.
Problems for U.S. Armed Forces
Staff from each service have already begun to consider the perceived problems of adapting and preparing selected U.S. Armed Forces for peace support duties. Although there are many aspects to consider, there is no reason to suppose that with the resources and innovative energy available, these problems, largely questions of operational detail, cannot be successfully addressed. There are several obvious areas where planning staff will have to focus their attention, particularly in the case of contested operations that amount to more than peacekeeping but fall short of a coalition enforcement action. The most challenging areas will occur at the U.S. interface with allies and the host country; obstacles to achieving a smoothly integrated UN force include:
* Degree of command subordination of U.S. units to multinational UN HQs
* Responsibilities for liaison and lateral communication
* Language and procedural problems within the host country
* Lack of agreed operating concepts and the need to develop a common modus operandi
* Difficulty of lateral coordination of effort between the civil and military elements of the force
* The decision to develop unilateral or multilateral emergency evacuation plans
* Overcoming the caveats on the use and release of strategic intelligence
* Whether to rely on UN or unilateral/national combat support arrangements.
Most of these problems will have to be resolved in the planning and training stages of preparation prior to deployment. In some cases it will take significant time and effort to design and put into effect a training system that can prepare future peace support contingents to a reasonable standard. The September-October debates in Congress have fostered political uncertainly on the preconditions and willingness to participate in UN operations. The net effect has been to delay and possibly even diminish PDD 13. They may have also reduced the urgency of professional staff to start the machinery to establish the additional facilities and organizations needed. However, in common with leading European armed forces, some embryo staff have already been established for this contingency, and training allocated, both in United States and USAREUR, which will provide the basis of future planning and training needs. In the event of a firm decision to engage more effort in multinational forces under the UN, military staff and training resources should not take long to mobilize.
It would be unduly optimistic to imagine there is no price to pay for U.S. nonparticipation during the painful 30-year development of UN operations, starting with the first UN Emergency Force that deployed to Suez in 1956. (3) Although the purely organizational problems cited above can be overcome, especially by a professional staff with the necessary resources to address them, there are much more fundamental issues arising from recent U.S. military history and service attitudes that, because they are quintessentially American in their nature, may be hard to recognize and even harder to overcome. The unusual characteristics of UN multinational peace support operations confront the American military psyche at several levels.
Problems of Strategic Approach
At the highest level it the U.S. military psyche has to contend with the specter of Vietnam. In the staff pyramid of the armed forces there is a fracture line that marks the separation of the Vietnam-experienced officers, who now occupy positions at the apex of their respective organizations, from the later intakes. At present it is safe to say that policy will be fundamentally influenced for perhaps another 5 years, by the former group. It is hardly surprising that instinctively this cadre will favor the deployment of decisive force in any future conflict where U.S. Armed Forces are involved. As a result there is a deeply held reluctance to become involved in future military commitments that could be construed as open ended, where U.S. forces may be subordinated to a foreign or multinational command and where the "American way of doing things" may have to be abandoned in favor or a less effective multinational procedure. This instinctive reluctance is fueled by politicians of both parties who are acutely sensitive on the "quagmire effect" of open-ended military commitments and even more vulnerable on the low public tolerance of casualties once photography of dead and wounded American servicemen reaches constituencies. The combination of domestic political sensitivity and the idiosyncratic historical experience of Vietnam tends to separate the United States from even their closest allies in the operating concepts of their participation in a UN multinational force. The acrimony and dismay in Washington over the European lack of support for the U.S. military proposals in former Yugoslavia, and the Italian efforts to distance themselves from U.S. tactics in Mogadishu are indications of a fundamental difference of approach.
The nature of recent military successes in Panama and Kuwait/Iraq reinforces the position of the Vietnam-experience lobby. In both contingencies it was possible to achieve swift military success using overwhelming U.S. force levels, concentrated for a short, finite period of intense activity. Not only were both actions highly successful, but they can be used to demonstrate the validity of U.S. war fighting doctrines, the preeminence of U.S. military technology, and the soundness of the policy to deploy only at decisive force levels.
Given their historical background and in view of these solid achievements, it is hardly surprising that there is considerable reluctance in Washington, both politically and militarily, to entertain the apparently weak and open-ended policies that seem to prevail among the European members of the UN contingent contributors club. This antipathy for the "limp wristed" approach was emphasized during a spring 1993 visit to (European) UN contingents based at Split, when a U.S. member of the Senate remarked that the UN unit commanders' preference for negotiation and consensus over the unequivocal use of force was not the exercise of tactical option but a fundamental consequence of their having to operate from a position of weakness. It was not, the visitor felt, an option that would face U.S. forces if they found themselves in the same theater.
Despite the obvious political attractions in Washington for the application of "decisive force" to future UN operations, there are several problems that will undermine the success of this approach. First, it is both internationally more acceptable and militarily less costly for the United States to support and ensure a successful UN multinational solution rather than a unilateral US military initiative. Second, the decisive use of military force to achieve a mandate assumes that there are military targets, military tasks, and identifiable "enemy" forces. But in reality the situation is more complicated. There will be no easily identifiable targets against which to use decisive force and the long-term strategic objectives of the mandate will be primarily political in which the military element must play a subordinate role. In a typical mid-level scenario there are no quick-fix problems that have an easily identified beginning and end state. The social damage of intercommunal violence on the scale of Bosnia, Angola, or Somalia is so deep and divisive that it is quite unrealistic to imagine that after a 6-month cease-fire and restructuring program these collapsed states can be abandoned on the grounds that they have suddenly become viable, stand-alone structures. They will require healing processes that are measured in decades not months and a military element will be an essential component of that process. If the international community under the United Nations, or led by the United States, is to intervene, it should not ignore the realities of the situation on the ground so as to facilitate their desire for a quick-fix solution that will respond to the use of force. Not only is the long-term approach more realistic, it is cheaper, more humane, and internationally stabilizing than allowing intercommunal violence to flourish in an abhorrent and threatening manner.
In these circumstances the use of decisive force on an overwhelming scale that initially subdues and marginalizes any factions that may oppose the peace plan, is not an option. The senator who observed that the conciliatory approach of the European contingents in Bosnia was imposed on them by their weakness omitted to observe that using force to achieve their Bosnian mandate was certainly not an option either. The history of intervention shows that the intrusive arrival of a powerful and aggressive third-party force, particularly one that comprises largely foreign troops, will incite an equally determined and aggressive reaction and rejection by local people. (4) Even local communities, who should by their politics and inclination have every reason to welcome their arrival, will find it hard to support them actively, and it is increasingly evident that this category of active support is an essential condition for success.
Only if the third party can subjugate the host country in the manner of an occupying forces does the need for civil support become marginalized. It is true that, in the initial states of an intervention of this scale, the presence of a massive third-party military forces has an overpowering effect on local opposition, after which law and order can be swiftly restored. However, when the novelty of their sudden arrival has worn off and the limitations of the intervening troops have been observed, disaffection and resistance will gather momentum. It is likely that faced with a deteriorating situation in these circumstances an intervention force, however massively deployed, would experience resistance and have to consider the use of subjugation methods that would not be acceptable to democratically elected governments of the Security Council, which may have authorized the intervention.
Isolated Military Culture
To be successful in a multinational force, continent staff officers must have a propensity for integration. Although in the preparatory phase of Desert Storm, U.S. staff were successful in negotiating a joint plan for the coalition forces, integration as partners on a more equal basis in a UN force may prove to be challenging. The majority of armed forces comprising the group of nations that habitually contribute to UN operations have a developed capability for integration. For the U.S. staff the geographical isolation of the United States is intensified by the enclosed nature of their service life. In Europe and the Southern hemisphere, there is neither the real estate nor the resources to separate the armed forces from the civil community. Consequently, in the nucleus of UN contributor states, armed forces are not only living is a less isolated manner as part of a civil community, but in some cases are also part of a multilingual environment. In addition, a much greater proportion of service personnel from smaller European armed forces will have served in NATO; in the relatively even smaller armed forces of NORDIC and Southern hemisphere nations, many long-service professional offers will have UN experience. These smaller nations already constitute a club, their officers an alumni, whose linguistic capabilities, experience, and attitude facilitate their integration in a multinational staff. They will tend to approach some issues from a different vantage point than their U.S. colleagues. Their professional expectations may be lower but in some cases more realistic; their capability to achieve targets through consensus and compromise, of necessity, more keenly developed. Above all, the UN veteran may understand better than his American colleague that it is sometimes more realistic to achieve a lesser objective at a slightly lower standard than to strive for the absolute solution. To some extent the weary cynicism of the UN veteran needs the energizing influence of an American approach, but there is also a need for a compromise that tempers the inclination for over achievement with a realism derived from hard-won experience.
Importance of Infantry
Along the running surfaces of the military element, UN troops will have to cooperate on a daily basis with local armed factions, protect the civilian aid agencies, and liaise successfully with UN soldiers from other nations. At the heart of this web of interaction stands the infantryman; in his humble way he is the key to its success. Much is required of him: if he behaves badly, overplays his hand, uses force indiscriminately, and fails to win the confidence of the local people who constitute his environment, the viability of the peace process in his neighborhood will begin to erode. In this role he is more than a combat infantryman. He has to be able to move and operate comfortably in an urban or rural environment, projecting an aura of goodwill and security to civilians he routinely meets, but at the same time, in an instant he must be able to protect himself or people in his care from a lethal attack.
The U.S. infantryman is trained to the highest degree for war fighting. His skills and physical development are specially designed to give him the best chance of survival in a hazardous, battlefield environment, but above all to overcome the enemy. In the conflict zone there are only friendly and enemy forces. Most of his training time and energy is directed to learning how to support friendly forces and search for, recognize, and finally destroy or neutralize the enemy. It is a stark landscape in which the players are characterized in absolute terms; there is no time or need to develop their characterization any further, friendly force soldiers are good and must be supported, enemy forces are bad and must be destroyed.
But in a mid-level intervention scenario, the infantryman's landscape is more complex. The subversives, who oppose the peace process and will probably kill him if given a risk-free opportunity, look exactly the same as the civilian population. Among the civilians there are some who will respond warmly to his presence and others who will shun him and even react with hostility. Even among the armed factions who ostensibly support the peace process there will be varying shades of enthusiasm, and these may alter as the overall political situation changes. Whatever threats exist for him beneath the inscrutable appearance and behavior of the local people, the infantryman cannot regard them as simply enemies or friends. He must present himself to them at all times as a supportive but neutral presence, friends, fair, but also firm. He remains impartial to the politics and moral judgments of the conflict in which he has intervened. His duty is first of all to the mandate that underwrites his presence and role. If individuals or schisms defy or disobey the mandate, he must deal with them equally, whether they are from the camp of his potential friends or potential enemies.
This places a great deal of responsibility on the infantryman, particularly on the personal skills of the junior officers who will have operate in small, sometimes isolated groups and make a great many decisions about the civil population around them. In addition to combat skills essential for this task, junior infantry leaders must develop capabilities that do not sit comfortably with a war-fighting ethos. They must be capable of negotiation, familiar with the tactics of compromise, able to use the threat of force as a bargaining tool and not in a direct gun-pointing manner that takes the situation immediately to the brink of violence. In situations where human rights are threatened, policing skills will be needed to gather evidence, protect and uphold the rights of threatened minorities and individuals, make searches that are effective but at the same time lawfully conducted, and make arrests. They will need to develop communication skills and an ability to reassure civilians that they meet routinely, encouraging them to talk, give information, and discuss their problems and anxieties. But in addition, the junior commander must above all maintain the skills of a top-class infantry soldier, and when the situation changes, they must act swiftly to handle a threatening confrontation, and in the last resort use lethal force in a cool and effective manner.
The U.S infantryman, trained intensely but narrowly for a war-fighting role, cannot be thrust into this complex scenario without preparation. It will require policy makers and their staff firstly to recognize the need for a range of skills that lie beyond current training parameters for war fighting, and secondly to allow combat units time for preparation and training before they are deployed into a peace support emergency. For all their particular skills there are several reasons why peace support operations should not become the special responsibility of the military police or civil affairs units--the most important of all being the need to combine these special peace support characteristics with the skills of a top-class infantryman, the latter taking much longer to perfect. The UK army's mechanized infantry has performed well in Bosnia, showing that individual communication and allied skills can flourish beside the survival instincts of infantry. Their successful Northern Ireland training programs re-role combat units from NATO divisions in Germany for foot-mobile duties in urban areas in 5 months. This seems to show not only that specialist unites are not required, but that a short spell of duty in a new and challenging role can have a very positive effect on a unit, especially at a junior commander level.
Although the end of the Cold War brought with it a change in the role and intensity of UN peace-support operations, it has taken some time for the special needs of these contingencies to be recognized. World wide, foreign affairs advisors continued to play down the significance of military participation, while some military staff advocated the use of decisive military force, even in situations where the strategic objectives were political and could not respond to a purely military solution. In some particular cases, gaps in approach have opened between the United States and her closest allies. This may be the result of an instinctive U.S. reliance on the decisive use of force that prevails at political and policy-making levels. In all forces the brunt of operations is carried by the infantry; it is important for these to have the skills and a concept for using force that are appropriate to the politically sensitive tasks in which civil support is essential. This is particularly important in mid-level operations that amount to more than peacekeeping but fall short of enforcement by all possible means. Overall, the U.S. Armed Forces are well endowed with resources and innovative energy, and provided the needs and special characteristics of UN forces can be recognized, there are no fundamental obstacles to individual units of U.S. Armed Forces, particularly the infantry, adapting to the tempo and nature of UN operations.
(1.) Ambassador M. K. Albright, "Use of Forces in a Post-Cold War World," National War College, 23 September 1993.
(2.) Both the UK and U.S. concepts use the tasks shown in John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, Draft Concept of Second Generation Multinational Operations 1993 (Providence: Watson Institute, 1993), 7-29.
(3.) Some might argue that U.S. forces provided vital strategic lift assets and essential equipment throughout this period. However, the "painful development" took place on the ground and did not involve U.S. forces.
(4.) For example, the rejection of MNF 2 in Beirut in 1983 and of the IPKF by the Tamils in the norther provinces of Sri Lanka in 1986-87.
John Mackinlay is senior research associate at the Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University. He is the author of The Peacekeepers, a study of Middle East peacekeeping operations.