Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

Journal of Philosophy Vol. 102, No. 2, February 2005

Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

Journal of Philosophy Vol. 102, No. 2, February 2005

Article excerpt

Evaluating Social Reasons: Hobbes vs. Hegel, ANTHONY SIMON LADEN

The paper develops a Hegelian approach to the evaluation of social reasons, reasons whose authority derives from norms of a plural subject. The Hegelian approach is contrasted along two dimensions with a Hobbesian approach, familiar from the work of David Gauthier. Where the Hobbesian requires that all social reasons are ultimately evaluated from an individual standpoint, the Hegelian approach allows social standpoints to play the fundamental evaluative role. Where the Hobbesian builds reasons out of ingredients to be found in an individual psyche that are thus essentially private, the Hegelian builds reasons out of principles of the will, which are essentially public and sharable. After drawing the contrasts, the author of this paper defends the Hegelian approach against some Hobbesian objections and points to further work that needs to be done in order fully to develop the Hegelian approach.

Toward a Projectivist Account of Color, EDWARD WILSON AVERILL

Color objectivism holds that the colors we visually attribute to objects are vision-independent properties (color realism) and that our perceptual representations of objects as colored are, in many cases, not only veridical but caused in a way that justifies the perceiver in believing that his visual representations are veridical. Using color variation arguments, this essay begins with a criticism of the objectivist theory of Alex Byrne and David Hilbert and goes on to set out a projectivist account that gives up their perceptual, but not their realist, assumption. The projectivism developed here explains how colors like red and green enter the visual system, and how the role they play in that system makes the objects we see, which are not colored, look colored. …

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