Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

Mind Vol. 114, No. 455, July 2005

Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

Mind Vol. 114, No. 455, July 2005

Article excerpt

Noise and Perceptual Indiscriminability, BENJ HELLIE

Perception represents colors inexactly. This inexactness results from phenomenally manifest noise and results in apparent violations of the transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability. Whether these violations are genuine depends on what is meant by "transitivity of perceptual indiscriminability."

Why Be Rational? NIKO KOLODNY

Normativity involves two kinds of relation. On the one hand, there is the relation of being a reason for. This is a relation between a fact and an attitude. On the other hand, there are relations specified by requirements of rationality. These are relations among a person's attitudes, viewed in abstraction from the reasons for them. The author of this article asks how the normativity of rationality--the sense in which we "ought" to comply with requirements of rationality--is related to the normativity of reasons--the sense in which we "ought" to have the attitudes that we have conclusive reason to have. The normativity of rationality is not straightforwardly that of reasons, the author argues; there are no reasons to comply with rational requirements in general. First, this would lead to "bootstrapping" because, contrary to the claims of John Broome, not all rational requirements have "wide scope." Second, it is unclear what such reasons to be rational might be. Finally, we typically do not, and in many cases could not, treat rational requirements as reasons. Instead, this paper suggests, rationality is only apparently normative, and the normativity that it appears to have is that of reasons. According to this "Transparency Account," rational requirements govern out' responses to our beliefs about reasons. The normative pressure that we feel, when rational requirements apply to us, derives from these beliefs: from the reasons that, as it seems to us, we have. …

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