Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

The Monist: Vol. 89, No. 3, July 2006

Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

The Monist: Vol. 89, No. 3, July 2006

Article excerpt

On the Process of Coming into Existence, ANTHONY GALTON

If something is in the process of coming into existence, it does not yet exist; so how can it be referred to? In this paper, several cases of coming into existence are examined, focusing on the temporal relationship between the process by which an object comes into existence and the time at which it first exists. This relates the problem of coming into existence to an array of modal concepts underlying the application of the imperfective aspect to telic verbs; and also to the well-known Vendler categories of state, activity, accomplishment, and achievement. It emerges that the problem of when an object first exists is separate from that of what it is for it to be in the process of coming into existence. An object may first exist at the beginning, middle, or end of the process by which it comes into existence, depending on the identity criteria for the type of object involved.

Everyday Concepts as a Guide to Reality, LYNNE RUDDER BAKER

This paper takes a nonreductive approach to the world as encountered. In it, the author contrasts ontological and semantic features of eliminativism, reductionism, and nonreductionism with respect to everyday concepts (like "chair"). She next sketches an ontology of ordinary objects, according to which all concrete ordinary objects are constituted objects, and she considers some objections to such a view. Finally, the author takes a new look at two old issues: ontological vagueness and the distinction between what is mind-dependent and what is mind-independent.

Disassembly and Destruction, ALLAN HAZLETT

In ontology it is common to endorse some version of the Locality Thesis (LT): Whether [p.sub.1] ... [p.sub.n] compose something supervenes only on the spatial and causal relations obtaining between [p.sub.1] ... [p.sub.n]. This paper argues that LT is false, because whether an object that has been disassembled has also been destroyed supervenes on whether it will be reassembled at some point in the future. …

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