Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

International Philosophical Quarterly: Vol. 48, No. 1, March 2008

Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

International Philosophical Quarterly: Vol. 48, No. 1, March 2008

Article excerpt

Karol Wojtyla (Pope John Paul II) found phenomenology very helpful for the analysis of concrete human experience and for overcoming the ethical formalism of Kant. Phenomenology, he believed, could also enrich classical Thomism by exploring the lived experience of freedom, interiority, and self-governance. But phenomenology, in his opinion, needed to be supplemented by metaphysics in order to ground experiences such as the sense of duty in the real order. He criticized much modern philosophy for abandoning metaphysics and thus neglecting the sapiential dimension. Since his career as a professor was very short, he did not have time to complete his project of a personalist Thomism in which phenomenology and metaphysics would be harmoniously combined.


In this paper Framarin argues that the prohibition on desire in the orthodox Indian systems is not simply a prohibition on selfish desires. The word "selfish" is ambiguous. It can mean either "self-interested" or "excessively self-interested." Since only excessively self-interested actions are prohibited, the prohibition on desire cannot be a prohibition on all self-interested desires. But the prohibition on desire cannot be a prohibition on excessively self-interested desires either, because this class of desires is too insignificant to explain the general preoccupation with the elimination of desire in the tradition. Finally, Framarin argues that selfish desires are indeed prohibited, but only if by "selfish" one means "based on false beliefs about the self." Even then, however, selfish desires do not exhaust the class of prohibited desires because some prohibited desires are based on false beliefs about things other than the self.


Are there any morally expendable emotions? That is, are there any emotions that could ideally, from a moral point of view, be eradicated from human life? Aristotle may have subscribed to the view that there are no such emotions, and for that reason--though not only for that reason--it merits investigation. Kristjansson first suggests certain revisions of the specifics of Aristotle's non-expendability claim that render it less counter-intuitive. He then shows that the plausibility of Aristotle's claim turns largely on the question of how emotions are to be individuated. After probing that question in relation to contemporary theories of emotion, he explores how our emotions and moral virtues relate to distinct spheres of human experience, and how emotion concepts can best carve up the emotional landscape. He argues finally that there exist certain normative reasons for specifying emotion concepts such that Aristotle's view holds good.

Temporality and the Future of Philosophy in Hegel's Phenomenology, JOHN RUSSON

In "Sense-Certainty" Hegel establishes "the now that is many nows" as the form of experience. This has implications for the interpretation of later figures within the Phenomenology of Spirit: specifically, the thing (from Chapter 2), the living body (from Chapter 4), and the ethical community (from Chapter 6) are each significantly different forms of such a "now" in which the way that past and future are held within the present differs. …

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