Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

Philosophy: Vol. 83, No. 1, January 2008

Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

Philosophy: Vol. 83, No. 1, January 2008

Article excerpt

A Metaphysics of Ordinary Things and Why We Need It, LYNNE RUDDER BAKER

Mainstream metaphysicians today take little ontological interest in the world as we interact with it. They interpret the variety of things in the world as variety only of concepts applied to things that are basically of the same sort--for example, sums of particles or temporal parts of particles. Baker challenges this approach by formulating and defending for a contrasting line of thought. Using what she calls 'the Constitution View,' she argues that ordinary things (like screwdrivers and walnuts) are as ontologically significant as particles. Baker further argues for why we need recourse to such ordinary things in our basic ontology.

Deconstructing the Laws of Logic, STEPHEN R. L. CLARK

Clark considers reasons for questioning 'the laws of logic' (identity, non-contradiction, excluded middle, and negation), and suggests that these laws do not accord with everyday reality. Either they are rhetorical tools rather than absolute truths, or else Plato and his successors were right to think that they identify a reality distinct from the ordinary world of experience, and also from the ultimate source of reality.

An Aristotelian Critique of Situationism, KRISTJAN KRISTJANSSON

Aristotle says that no human achievement has the stability of activities that express virtue. Ethical situationists consider this claim to be refutable by empirical evidence. If that is true, not only Aristotelianism, but folk psychology, contemporary virtue ethics and character education have all been seriously infirmed. The aim of this paper is threefold: (1) to offer a systematic classification of the existing objections against situationism under four main headings: 'the methodological objection', 'the moral dilemma objection', 'the bullet-biting objection' and 'the anti-behaviouristic objection'; (2) to resuscitate a more powerful Aristotelian version of the 'anti-behaviouristic objection' than advanced by previous critics; and (3) to explore some of the implications of such resuscitation for our understanding of the salience of character and for future studies of its nature.

What Is an Attributive Adjective? MILES RIND and LAUREN TILLINGHAST

Peter Geach's distinction between logically predicative and logically attributive adjectives has become part of the technical apparatus of philosophers, but no satisfactory explanation of what an attributive adjective is has yet been provided. …

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