Will the post-9/11 environment revive Canada--US intelligence cooperation and catalyze a security community? A comparative study based on intelligence principles, ideas, norms, orientations, and institutions drawn from the literature predicts cooperation but not necessarily a security community, owing to different (a) histories, (b) security interpretations/agenda placements, (c) political and legislative cultures, (d) degrees of public acceptance, and (e) domestic-international inclinations. Waning British influences, evaporating Anglo-Saxon identities, and changing strategic interests compel Canada to play Thomas Hughes's butcher role, and the US the more encompassing intelligence policy maker role.
Questions and roles
The broader war against terrorism raises pertinent North American questions: Will Canada and the United States revive the Cold War security community? (1) What role will intelligence, with its capacity to catalyze preemption-based policy, play in any security based cooperation, and what role is needed for intelligence in order for the 2005 Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) between Canada, Mexico, and the United States to succeed?
Although Winn L. Taplin defines intelligence as consisting "of the collection, analysis, evaluation, and dissemination of information for 'positive' intelligence and counterintelligence and the conduct of Special Activities (covert action)," (2) Thomas Hughes's role orientations characterize the subject better. (3) Intelligence, Hughes posits, boils down to playing the roles of the butcher (keeping intelligence a permanently top-priority concern), the baker (formulating consistently high levels of intelligence expenditures), or the intelligence-policy maker (running across the entire spectrum, from the drawing board to the trenches, serving as both butcher and baker). (4) The comparative study of orientations and institutions offered in this article, based on criteria articulated by Taplin and Michael A. Turner, finds (a) Canada playing the butcher and the United States the intelligence-policy maker roles; and (b) both roles limiting mutual cooperation due to different military cultures and global positioning.
Comparing orientations and intelligence institutions
Similar security portraits can produce different policy outcomes, as is evident if done places principles, ideas, and norms under the microscope. Table 1 illustrates this with Taplin's six principles.
Table 1. Intelligence principles: Canada-US comparisons.
Principles Canada United States
1. Intelligence derives It stems from both Stemming from domestic
from international, as domestic and circumstances,
opposed to domestic, international intelligence took an
conflict or rivalry conflictual international shift,
circumstances and shows at two-flank
2. Conduct or use of True True
3. Clandestine collection True True
of information is the
fundamental activity of
4. Truth must be the Not always true Not always true
basis of good
5. Intelligence in a True True
vacuum is of no value;
tardy intelligence is of
6. Special activities Domestically true, True, but undergoes
must involve native not so abroad trials and errors
knowledge of the internationally
national groups toward
which they are directed
Source: Adapted from Taplin (1989, 475--91).
Nuances, rather than contrasts, riddle the principles picture. As the first dimension acknowledges, intelligence derives from international conflict or rivalry for both countries. …