Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: July 2010, Vol. 81, No. 1

Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: July 2010, Vol. 81, No. 1

Article excerpt

Non-conceptual Experiential Content and Reason-giving, HEMDAT LERMAN

According to John McDowell and Bill Brewer, our experiences have the type of content which can be the content of judgments--content which is the result of the actualization of specific conceptual abilities. They defend this view by arguing that our experiences must have such content in order for us to be able to think about our environment. This paper shows that they do not provide a conclusive argument for this view. Focusing on Brewer's version of the argument, it shows that their version rests on a questionable assumption--namely, that if a subject can recognize the normative bearing of a mental content upon what he should think and do, then this content must be the result of the actualization of conceptual capacities (and in this sense conceptual). The paper argues that considerations regarding the roles played by experience and concepts in our mental lives may require us to reject this assumption.

The Way Things Were, DAVID SANSON and BEN CAPLAN

Context Sensitivity and Indirect Reports, NELLIE WIELAND

This paper argues that Contextualist theories of semantics are not undermined by their purported failure to explain the practice of indirect reporting. …

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