Academic journal article NBER Reporter

Market Design Working Group

Academic journal article NBER Reporter

Market Design Working Group

Article excerpt

The NBER's Working Group on Market Design, directed by Susan Athey and Parag A. Pathak of NBER and MIT, met in Cambridge on October 8 and 9, 2010. These papers were discussed:

* Dirk Bergemann and Johannes Horner, Yale University, "Should Auctions Be Transparent?"

* Simon Board, University of California, Los Angeles, and Andrzej Skrzypacz, Stanford University, "Optimal Dynamic Auctions for Durable Goods: Posted Prices and Fire Sales"

* Mallesh M. Pal, University of Pennsylvania, and Rakesh Vohra, Northwestern University, "Optimal Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders"

* Lawrence M. Ausubel and Oleg V. Baranov, University of Maryland, "Core-Selecting Auctions with Incomplete Information"

* Sven Seuken and David C. Parkes, Harvard University, and Denis Charles, Max Chickering, Mary Czerwinski, Kamal Jain, Sidd Puri, and Desney Tan, Microsoft Research, "Hidden Market Design: A Peer-to-Peer Backup Market"

* Gary E. Bolton, Penn State University; Ben Greiner, University of New South Wales; and Axel Ockenfels, University of Cologne, "Engineering Trust: Reciprocity in the Production of Reputation Information"

* Soohyung Lee, University of Maryland; Muriel Niederle, Stanford University and NBER, and Hye-Rim Kim and Woo-Keum Kim, Korea Marriage Culture Institute, "Propose with a Rose? …

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