Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

Phronesis: 2012, Vol. 57, No. 1

Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

Phronesis: 2012, Vol. 57, No. 1

Article excerpt

Modes of Being at Sophist 255c-e, FIONA LEIGH

This article argues for a new interpretation of the argument for the nonidentity of Being and Difference at Sophist 255c-e, which turns on a distinction between modes of being a property. Though indebted to Frede, the distinction differs from his in an important respect: What distinguishes the modes is not the subject's relation to itself or to something numerically distinct, but whether it constitutes or conforms to the specification of some property. Thus the author's view, but not Frede's, allows for self-participation of the Forms. Against Frede and the more traditional interpretation, the author maintains that the distinction is not introduced by way of the pros alla/kath' hauta distinction, or by way of uses or senses of the verb "to be," but is established prior to the argument and is deployed in its frame. Moreover, since the author reads the argument's scope as restricted to properties in what she calls the attribute mode, her interpretation can explain, as its rivals cannot, why the criterion of difference at 255d6-7 does not apply to the Form Difference itself.--Correspondence to: fiona.leigh@ucl.ac.uk

The Origin and Aim of Posterior Analytics II. 19, DAVID BRONSTEIN

In Posterior Analytics II.19, Aristotle raises and answers the question, how do first principles become known? The usual view is that the question asks about the process or method by which we learn principles and that his answer is induction. The author argues that the question asks about the original prior knowledge from which principles become known and that his answer is perception. …

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