Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

Phronesis: 2012, Vol. 57, No. 2

Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

Phronesis: 2012, Vol. 57, No. 2

Article excerpt

The Symposium and Platonic Ethics: Plato, Vlastos, and a Misguided Debate, FRISBEE SHEFFIELD

Scholarship on the Symposium is dominated by a debate on interpersonal love started by Gregory Vlastos in his article, "The Individual as an Object of Love in Plato." This paper argues that this debate is a misguided one, because it is not reflective of the central concerns of this text. Attention needs to be turned to the broader ethical questions posed about the ends of life, the nature of human happiness, and contemplation. Failure to do so will mean that the Symposium continues to be eclipsed as a key resource in central debates in Platonic ethics.--Correspondence to: fccs2@cam.ac.uk

Why Does Aristotle Think That Ethical Virtue Is Required for Practical Wisdom? URSULA COOPE

This paper asks why Aristotle thinks that ethical virtue (rather than mere self-control) is required for practical wisdom. It argues that a satisfactory answer will need to explain why being prone to bad appetites implies a failing of the rational part of the soul. The paper goes on to claim that the self- controlled person does suffer from such a rational failing: a failure to take a specifically rational kind of pleasure in fine action. However, this still leaves a problem: could there not be someone who (unlike the self-controlled person) took the right kind of pleasure in free action, but who failed to be virtuous on account of bad appetites? If so, would such a person be practically wise but not virtuous? …

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