This article presents in English translation three important documents which delineate the constitutional principles aspired for in post-revolution Egypt (January 25, 2011). They are known as the Azhar Document (June 2011), the National Council Document (July 2011), and the Silmi Document (November 2011). They represent visions of a future Egypt analyzed in an introduction by the author that provides insights into the historical context, issues debated, and concerns attended to in drafting these documents. Though they did not result in a concrete declaration, they created a rich environment where principles of freedom, social justice, development, education, civil rights, and citizenship were discussed.

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The process of drafting Egypt's post-revolution constitution has been far from easy, not least because of the complex role played by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). As a consequence of the army's historic role as the protector of the Egyptian people, SCAF was charged with "running the country" once it decided to recognize the revolution as the manifestation of popular will. One of the most memorable chants of the revolution was: "The army and the people are one," an expression of a special historical link between the two. The transitional option, authorized by SCAF, was the amendment of several articles of the 1971 constitution--which was technically rendered void by the revolution--signaling the beginning of the transitional period, and, in March 2011, the amended articles were approved by 77% in a public referendum.

The revolutionaries called for a new constitution and rejected the amendment of the old one by a committee dominated by the Muslim Brothers and where the majority of Egyptian political factions were unrepresented. The aforesaid committee drafted a constitutional declaration based on which SCAF was supposed to run the country during the transitional period. This declaration offered a temporary replacement of the old constitution, which could not have remained in effect after the revolution for a variety of internal and national security reasons. But the most important reason in favor of the declaration was that it enabled SCAF to become the "de facto ruler" of the country and to temporarily exercise full legislative and executive powers until the election of a new parliament and a new president. In other words, SCAF bestowed upon itself powers that were not mentioned in the 1971 constitution.

The major bone of contention in the new constitutional declaration was the amendment of Article 189 and Article 189 bis, both of which were merged into Article 60 of the constitutional declaration. Article 60 essentially placed the new constitution under the parliament's control, for it gave the elected members of the People's Assembly, the Lower House of Parliament, and the Consultative Assembly, the Upper House of Parliament, the fight to elect a 100-member committee to draft Egypt's new constitution. This posed a major constitutional setback since it made the formation of the Constituent Assembly in charge of writing the constitution subject to the will of the current majority. It was thus anticipated that Islamist parties, basically the Muslim Brotherhood and ultra-conservative Salafis, would engage in a survival battle in which they would fight determinedly for control over the constitution in an already fractured society that had sustained fatal political and cultural damage at the hands of the former regime.

The constitutional declaration divided the Egyptian people into two camps. One camp, which included nationalist, Nasserist, socialist, and liberal powers and the majority of revolutionary youths, called for drafting the constitution before parliamentary and presidential elections. The other camp, basically made up of political Islamist forces, insisted on adhering to what they termed the "popular will" as it was manifested in the March 2011 referendum results, and on holding elections before drafting the constitution. …