Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: July 2012, Vol. 85, No. 1

Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: July 2012, Vol. 85, No. 1

Article excerpt

A (Different) Virtue Epistemology, JOHN GRECO

This article begins by articulating a genus-species claim: that knowledge is a kind of success from ability and applies this idea to questions about the nature and value of knowledge. The essay goes on to ask what it would take to turn the genus-species claim into a proper theory of knowledge; that is, into informative, necessary, and sufficient conditions. That question is raised in the context of an important line of objection against even the genus-species claim; namely, that there is no way to understand the attribution relation so that it does all the work that it is supposed to do. The paper then reviews several extant proposals for understanding the attribution relation, and argues that none of them are adequate for answering the objection. It instead proposes a different way of understanding the relation, arguing that the resulting view resolves the objection. The essay completes the new account by proposing a way to understand intellectual abilities and briefly addressing Barn Facade cases, lottery propositions, and a question about the scope of knowledge.

The Value Question in Metaphysics, GUY KAHANE

Much seems to be at stake in metaphysical questions about, for example, God, free will, or morality. One thing that could be at stake is the value of the universe we inhabit--how good or bad it is. We can think of competing philosophical positions as describing possibilities, ways the world might turn out to be, and to which value can be assigned. When, for example, people hope that God exists, or fear that we do not possess free will, they express attitudes towards these possibilities, attitudes that presuppose answers to questions about their comparative value. …

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