Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

Mind Vol. 122, Issue 486, April 2013

Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

Mind Vol. 122, Issue 486, April 2013

Article excerpt

Social Anti-Individualism, Co-Cognitivism, and Second Person Authority, JANE HEAL

We are social primates, for whom language-mediated cooperative thinking ("co-cognition") is a central element of our shared life. Psychological concepts may be illuminated by appreciating their role in enriching and improving such co-cognition--a role which is importantly different from that of enabling detailed prediction and control of thoughts and behavior. This account of the nature of psychological concepts ("co-cognitivism") has a natural corollary in social anti-individualism about thought content. The combination of co-cognitivism and anti-individualism further suggests that, in addition to the familiar first person authority with which we ascribe thoughts to ourselves, there may also be something deserving the name "second person authority."

A Succession of Feelings, in and of Itself, is Not a Feeling of Succession, CHRISTOPH HOERL

Variants of the slogan that a succession of experiences (in and of itself) does not amount to an experience of succession are commonplace in the philosophical literature on temporal experience. The author distinguishes three quite different arguments that might be captured using this slogan: the individuation argument, the unity argument, and the causal argument. Versions of the unity and the causal argument are often invoked in support of a particular view of the nature of temporal experience sometimes called intentionalism, and against a rival view sometimes called extensionalism. The author examines these arguments in light of the individuation argument. In particular, he shows that the individuation argument is, at least prima facie, neutral between intentionalism and extensionalism; and once the individuation argument is in place, the unity and causal argument also lose their force against extensionalism.

A Passivity Prior to Passive and Active: Merleau-Ponty's Re-Reading of the Freudian Unconscious and Looking at Lascaux, FIONA HUGHES

Merleau-Ponty's understanding of "passivity" is a key to his account of perception, which, for him, is the way in which we are involved in the world and that on which the functions of understanding, reason, and reflection ultimately rest. …

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