Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. 87, No. 3, November 2013

Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. 87, No. 3, November 2013

Article excerpt

Testimony As a Social Foundation of Knowledge, ROBERT AUDI

Testimony is the mainstay of human communication and essential for the spread of knowledge. But testimony may also spread error. Under what conditions does it yield knowledge in the person addressed? Must the recipient trust the attester? Does the attester have to know what is affirmed? A related question is what is required for the recipient to be justified in believing testimony. Is testimony-based justification acquired in the same way as testimony-based knowledge? This paper addresses these and other questions. It offers a theory of the role of testimony in producing knowledge and justification, a sketch of a conception of knowledge that supports this theory, a brief account of how trust of others can be squared with critical habits of mind, and an outline of some important standards for intellectual responsibility in giving and receiving testimony.

Internalism and Externalism in the Epistemology of Testimony, MIKKEL GERKEN

Noneism, Ontology, and Fundamentality, TATJANA VON SOLODKOFF and RICHARD WOODWARD

In the recent literature on all things metaontological, discussion of a notorious Meinongian doctrine--the thesis that some objects have no kind of being at all--has been conspicuous by its absence. And this is despite the fact that this thesis is the central element of the noneist metaphysics of Richard Routley and Graham Priest. This paper examines the metaontological foundations of noneism, with a view to seeing exactly how the noneist's approach to ontological inquiry differs from the orthodox Quinean one. The authors proceed by arguing that the core anti-Quinean element in noneism has routinely been misidentified: the real difference is that the noneist rejects what the authors identify as Quine's "translate-and-deflate" methodology. The authors then examine the differences between the noneist's conception of ontology and that offered by the fundamentalist. They argue that these two anti-Quinean approaches differ in terms of their respective conceptions of the theoretical role associated with the notion of being. The contrast that emerges between them is, in the end, an explanatory one.

An Appearance of Succession Requires a Succession of Appearances, OLIVER RASHBROOK

A familiar slogan in the literature on temporal experience is that "a succession of appearances, in and of itself, does not amount to an experience of succession." The author distinguishes between a strong and a weak sense of this slogan. He diagnoses the strong interpretation of the slogan as requiring the support of an assumption he calls the "Seems-Seemed" claim. …

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