Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. 88, No. 1, January 2014

Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research Vol. 88, No. 1, January 2014

Article excerpt

Exercising Doxastic Freedom, CONOR McHUGH

This paper defends the possibility of doxastic freedom, arguing that doxastic freedom should be modelled not on freedom of action but on freedom of intention. Freedom of action is exercised by agents like us, the author argues, through voluntary control. This involves two conditions, intentions-reactivity and reasons-reactivity, that are not met in the case of doxastic states. Freedom of intention is central to our agency and to our moral responsibility, but is not exercised through voluntary control. The author develops and defends an account of freedom of intention, arguing that constitutive features of intention ensure that freedom of intention cannot require voluntary control. Then he shows that an analogous argument can be applied to doxastic states. The author argues that if we had voluntary control of intentions or of doxastic states, this would actually undermine our freedom.

How To Be Sure: Sensory Exploration and Empirical Certainty, MOHAN MATTHEN

One Dogma of Millianism, DEREK BALL and BRYAN PICKEL

From Mathematical Fictionalism to Truth-Theoretic Fictionalism,

BRADLEY ARMOUR-GARB and JAMES A. WOODBRIDGE

Intention and Motor Representation in Purposive Action, STEPHEN A. BUTTERFILL and CORRADO SINIGAGLIA

Are there distinct roles for intention and motor representation in explaining the purposiveness of action? Standard accounts of action assign a role to intention but are silent on motor representation. The temptation is to suppose that nothing need be said here because motor representation is either only an enabling condition for purposive action or else merely a variety of intention. This paper provides reasons for resisting that temptation. Some motor representations, like intentions, coordinate actions in virtue of representing outcomes; but, unlike intentions, motor representations cannot feature as premises or conclusions in practical reasoning. …

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