Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

Mind Vol. 123, Issue 490, April 2014

Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

Mind Vol. 123, Issue 490, April 2014

Article excerpt

Logic Informed, JUSTIN BLEDIN

Do logically valid arguments necessarily preserve truth? Certain inferences involving informational modal operators and indicative conditionals suggest that truth preservation and good deductive argument come apart. Given this split, this paper recommends an alternative to the standard truth preservation view of logic on which validity and good deductive argument coincide: logic is a descriptive science that is fundamentally concerned not with the preservation of truth, but with the preservation of structural features of information. In addition, this paper defends modus ponens for the indicative against an attack by Kolodny and MacFarlane, and presents a new proof system appropriate to this informational view.

Untyped Pluralism, SALVATORE FLORIO

In the semantic debate about plurals, pluralism is the view that a plural term denotes some things in the domain of quantification and a plural predicate denotes a plural property, that is, a property that can be instantiated by many things jointly. According to a particular version of this view, untyped pluralism, there is no type distinction between objects and properties. This article argues against untyped pluralism by showing that it is subject to a variant of a Russell-style argument put forth by Timothy Williamson and that it clashes with a plural version of Cantor's theorem. It concludes that pluralists should postulate a type distinction between objects and properties.

Appearance and Illusion, JAMES GENONE

Recent debates between representational and relational theories of perceptual experience sometimes fail to clarify in what respect the two views differ. This paper explains that the relational view rejects two related claims endorsed by most representationalists: the claim that perceptual experiences can be erroneous, and the claim that having the same representational content is what explains the indiscriminability of veridical perceptions and phenomenally matching illusions or hallucinations. …

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