Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 64, Issue 257, October 2014

Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

The Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 64, Issue 257, October 2014

Article excerpt

A Defence of Epistemic Consequentialism, KRISTOFFER AHLSTROM-VIJ and JEFFREY DUNN

Epistemic consequentialists maintain that the epistemically right (for example, the justified) is to be understood in terms of conduciveness to the epistemic good (for example, true belief). Given the wide variety of epistemological approaches that assume some form of epistemic consequentialism, and the controversies surrounding consequentialism in ethics, it is surprising that epistemic consequentialism remains largely uncontested. However, in a recent paper, Selim Berker has provided arguments that allegedly lead to a rejection of epistemic consequentialism. In the present paper, it is shown that reliabilism--the most prominent form of epistemic consequentialism, and one of Berker's main targets--survives Berker's arguments unscathed.

Responsibility for Wrongdoing Without Blameworthiness: How it Makes Sense and How it Doesn't, KYLE G. FRITZ

Some writers, such as John Fischer and Michael McKenna, have recently claimed that an agent can be morally responsible for a wrong action and yet not be blameworthy for that action. A careful examination of the claim, however, suggests two readings. On one reading, there are further conditions on blameworthiness beyond freely and wittingly doing wrong. On another innocuous reading, there are no such further conditions. Despite Fischer and McKenna's attempts to offer further conditions on blameworthiness in addition to responsibility for wrongdoing, this paper argues that only the innocuous reading is plausible. Once we distinguish between blame being deserved and blame being all-things-considered appropriate, we need not appeal to further conditions on blameworthiness. This discussion has important upshots regarding how compatibilists respond to certain manipulation arguments and how proponents of derived responsibility respond to criticism that agents are responsible even for outcomes that are not reasonably foreseeable. …

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