Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

The Philosophical Quarterly: Vol. 65, Issue 258, January 2015

Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

The Philosophical Quarterly: Vol. 65, Issue 258, January 2015

Article excerpt

A Normatively Neutral Definition of Paternalism, EMMA C. BULLOCK

In this paper, it is argued that a definition of paternalism must meet certain methodological constraints. Given the failings of descriptivist and normatively charged definitions of paternalism, it is argued that we have good reason to pursue a normatively neutral definition. Archard's 1990 definition is one such account. This paper argues that Archard's account is extensionally inadequate, failing to capture some cases which are clear instances of paternalism. This paper refines each of his three conditions, ultimately providing an improved definition of paternalistic interference. This revised definition meets specific methodological constraints, offering a definition that is both neutral between anti- and pro-paternalistic intuitions, but that also explains why paternalism is normatively significant. Specifically, this definition captures the conflict between interfering with an individual's choices and treating the individual benevolently, without making paternalism permissible or impermissible by definition.

The Russellian Monist's Problems with Mental Causation, ROBERT HOWELL

Russellian Monism, the view that phenomenal or protophenomenal properties serve as the categorical grounds of physical dispositions, has increasingly been thought to enjoy an advantage over traditional property dualism in that it avoids epiphenomenalism. This paper argues otherwise. Russellian Monism faces problems with mental causation that parallel those of traditional dualism. The best it can hope for is that phenomenal properties are causally relevant, but not in virtue of their phenomenality.

Restricting Spinoza's Causal Axiom, JOHN MORRISON

Spinoza's causal axiom is at the foundation of the Ethics. This essay motivates, develops, and defends a new interpretation that it calls the "causally restricted interpretation. …

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