Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Vol. 91, No. 1, July 2015

Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Vol. 91, No. 1, July 2015

Article excerpt

Permissive Rationality and Sensitivity, BENJAMIN ANDERS LEVINSTEIN

Permissivism about rationality is the view that there is sometimes more than one rational response to a given body of evidence. This paper discusses the relationship between permissivism, deference to rationality, and peer disagreement. It begins by arguing that--contrary to popular opinion--permissivism supports at least a moderate version of conciliationism. It then formulates a worry for permissivism. It shows that, given a plausible principle of rational deference, permissive rationality seems to become unstable and to collapse into unique rationality. It concludes with a formulation of a way out of this problem on behalf of the permissivist.

Problems with Norms of Assertion, PETER PAGIN

This paper draws attention to a number of problems that afflict norm accounts of assertion, that is, accounts that explain what assertion is, and typically how speakers understand what assertion is, by appeal to a norm of assertion. It argues that the disagreements in the literature over norm selection undermines such an account of understanding. It also argues that the treatment of intuitions as evidence in the literature undermines much of the connection to empirical evidence. It further argues that appeals made to conversational patterns do not require the existence of any norms at all.

Delusions, Acceptances, and Cognitive Feelings, RICHARD DUB

Psychopathological delusions have a number of features that are curiously difficult to explain. Delusions are resistant to counterevidence and impervious to counterargument. Delusions are theoretically, affectively, and behaviorally circumscribed: delusional individuals often do not act on their delusions and often do not update beliefs on the basis of their delusions. Delusional individuals are occasionally able to distinguish their delusions from other beliefs, sometimes speaking of their "delusional reality." To explain these features, the author offers a model according to which, contrary to appearances, delusions are not beliefs at all. …

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