Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

European Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 23, No. 3, September 2015

Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

European Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 23, No. 3, September 2015

Article excerpt

On a Supposed Solution to the Reinhold/Sidgwick Problem in Kant's Metaphysics of Morals, COURTNEY D. FUGATE

The purpose of this paper is to challenge the suggestion that Kant offers a solution to the Reinhold/Sidgwick problem in his Metaphysics of Morals. The problem, briefly, is about how Kant can hold moral evil to be imputable when he also seems to hold that freedom is found only in moral actions. After providing a new formulation of this problem under the title "Objection R/S" and describing the popular strategy for addressing it through reference to this text, the paper recounts some of the history relevant to interpreting the passage in question. The paper then argues that this strategy is not supported by the text and indeed proves to be contrary to other arguments that are central to Kant's moral thought. The closing section briefly considers other possible ways of addressing the Objection R/S.

Not All Attitudes Are Propositional, ALEX GRZANKOWSKI

Most contemporary philosophical discussions of intentionality start and end with a treatment of the propositional attitudes. In fact, many theorists hold (tacitly if not explicitly) that all attitudes are propositional attitudes. Our folk-psychological ascriptions suggest, however, that there are nonpropositional attitudes: I like Sally; my brother fears snakes; everyone loves my grandmother; and Rush Limbaugh hates Obama. This paper argues that things are as they appear: there are nonpropositional attitudes. More specifically, it argues that there are attitudes that relate individuals to nonpropositional objects and do so not in virtue of relating them to propositions. The paper reaches this conclusion by not only showing that attempted analyses of apparently nonpropositional attitudes in terms of the propositional fail, but that some nonpropositional attitudes don't even supervene on propositional attitudes. If this is correct, then the common discussions of intentionality that address only propositional attitudes are incomplete, and those who hold that all intentional states are propositional are mistaken.

The Artwork and the Promesse du Bonheur in Adorno, JAMES GORDON FINLAYSON

Adorno's saying that "art is the promise of happiness" radiates into every comer of his work, from his aesthetic theory to his critical theory of society. However, it is much misunderstood. This can be seen from the standard answer to the question: in virtue of what formal features do artworks, according to Adorno, promise happiness? The standard answer to this question suggests that the aesthetic harmony occasioned by the organic wholeness of the form realized in the artwork contrasts with and throws into relief the antagonistic nature of society. The trouble is that this answer is flatly incompatible with Adorno's historicism and central components of his aesthetic modernism, including his critique of classicism, and his negativism. This article proposes a reinterpretation of Adorno's thesis that art is the promise of happiness that overcomes these difficulties.

Cognitive Spread: Under What Conditions Does the Mind Extend Beyond the Body? ZED ADAMS and CHAUNCEY MAHER

The extended mind hypothesis (EMH) is the claim that the mind can and does extend beyond the human body. Adams and Aizawa contend that arguments for EMH commit a "coupling constitution fallacy." This paper denies that the master argument for EMH commits such a fallacy. But there is an important question lurking behind Adams and Aizawa's allegation: under what conditions is cognition spread across a tightly coupled system? Building on some suggestions from Haugeland, this paper contends that the system must exhibit a distinctive sort of semantic activity, semantic activity that the system as a whole takes responsibility for.

Between Determinism and Indeterminism: The Freedom of Choice in Fichte's Das System der Sittenlehre, KIEN-HOW GOH

This paper examines Fichte's conception of the freedom of choice in Das System der Sittenlehre of 1798 as a solution to the dilemma posed by determinism and indeterminism. …

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