Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Vol. 92, No. 1, January 2016

Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research: Vol. 92, No. 1, January 2016

Article excerpt

Justified Belief: Knowledge First-Style, CHRISTOPH KELP

Recent knowledge first epistemology features a number of different accounts of justified belief, including a knowledge first reductionism according to which to believe justifiably is to know, a knowledge first version of accessibilism, and a knowledge first version of mentalism. This paper offers a knowledge first version of virtue epistemology and argues that it is preferable to its knowledge first epistemological rivals: only knowledge first virtue epistemology manages to steer clear of a number of problems that its competition encounters.

Scoring Imprecise Credences: A Mildly Immodest Proposal, CONOR MAYO-WILSON and GREGORY WHEELER

Jim Joyce argues for two amendments to probabilism. The first is the doctrine that credences are rational, or not, in virtue of their accuracy or closeness to truth. The second is a shift from numerically precise model of belief to an imprecise model represented by a set of probability functions. This paper argues that both amendments cannot be satisfied simultaneously. To do so, it employs a (slightly generalized) impossibility theorem of Seidenfeld, Schervish, and Kadane, who show that there is no strictly proper scoring rule for imprecise probabilities. The question then is what should give way. Joyce, who is well aware of this no-go result, thinks that a quantifiability constraint on epistemic accuracy should be relaxed to accommodate imprecision. …

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