Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

PHRONESIS: Vol. 64, No. 1, January 2019

Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

PHRONESIS: Vol. 64, No. 1, January 2019

Article excerpt

Intrinsic Valuing and the Limits of Justice: Why the Ring of Gyges Matters, LER PAYTAS and NICHOLAS R. BAIMA

Commentators such as Terence Irwin and Christopher Shields claim that the Ring of Gyges argument in Republic 2 cannot demonstrate that justice is chosen only for its consequences. This is because valuing justice for its own sake is compatible with judging its value to be overridable. Through examination of the rational commitments involved in valuing normative ideals such as justice, the authors aim to show that this analysis is mistaken. If Glaucon is right that everyone would endorse Gyges' behavior, it follows that nobody values justice intrinsically. Hence, the Gyges story constitutes a more serious challenge than critics maintain.

Aristotle on Virtue of Character and the Authority of Reason, JOZEF MULLER

The author argues that, for Aristotle, virtue of character is a state of the nonrational part of the soul that makes one prone to making and acting on decisions in virtue of that part's standing in the right relation to (correct) reason, namely, a relation that qualifies the agent as a true self-lover. In effect, this central feature of virtue of character is nothing else than love of practical wisdom. As Muller argues, it not only explains how reason can hold direct authority over nonrational desires but also why Aristotle defines virtue of character as hexis prohairetike.

Aristotle contra Plato on the Voluntariness of Vice: The Arguments of Nicomachean Ethics 3. …

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