Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY: Vol. 8, No. 2, August 2000

Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY: Vol. 8, No. 2, August 2000

Article excerpt

Davidson on Meaning Normativity: Public or Social, JOHN FENNELL

This paper argues that contained in Davidson's philosophy of language are two incompatible positions concerning the foundation of meaning normativity: first, that meaning norms are just publicly observable regularities in use, and second, that they require socially constituted agreements. Davidson's methodological device of radical interpretation suggests the former, while the constitutive role he accords to charity entails the latter. In addition to the problem of incompatibility that the presence of both creates in his work, the paper argues that radical interpretation actually presupposes social agreements in meanings (and beliefs) which undermines the public account it apparently supports, providing grounds instead for a more fully social view. Thus Davidson, sometimes in spite of himself, defends a social rather than a public conception of meaning normativity.--Correspondence to: johnfennel149@hotmail.com

What is the Question for Which Hegel's Theory of Recognition is the Answer? ROBERT B. PIPPIN

The claim is that Hegel's "theory of recognition" is intended as an answer to a specific question in his systematic philosophy. That question is the question of the nature and the very possibility of freedom. The thesis defended is controversial because it means that the theory of recognition is not to be primarily understood (as it often is in post-war Hegel scholarship) as a comprehensive transcendental theory about self-awareness, is not primarily a genetic theory about the formation of ego or social identity, and is not directly a normative theory of institutions or social justice. …

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