Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

RATIO: Vol. 13, No. 2, June 2000

Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

RATIO: Vol. 13, No. 2, June 2000

Article excerpt

Tennant on Knowable Truth, TIMOTHY WILLIAMSON

The paper responds to Neil Tennant's recent discussion of Fitch's so-called paradox of knowability in the context of intuitionistic logic. Tennant's criticisms of the author's earlier work on this topic are shown to rest on a principle about the assertibility of disjunctions with the absurd consequence that everything we could make true already is true. Tennant restricts the anti-realist principle that truth implies knowability in order to escape Fitch's argument, but a more complex variant of the argument is shown to elicit from his restricted principle exactly the consequences which it was intended to avoid.--Correspondence to: timothy.williamson@philosophy.oxford.ac.uk

Why is it Now?, WILLIAM LANE CRAIG

Humean Naturalism and the Problem of Induction, FRANCIS W. DAUER

Naturalized epistemology has shunned rationality, a hallmark of humanity since ancient Greece, and one of Quine's explicit motivations for urging naturalized epistemology is that Hume's problem of induction cannot be solved. However, Hume himself suggests a naturalistic solution which appeals to certain inferences or associations being non-capricious for us. The narrow focus of the paper is to present a "Humean Solution" which is an elaboration and defense of Hume's suggestion. …

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