Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

Ratio Vol. 14, No. 1, March 2001. (Philosophical Abstracts)

Academic journal article The Review of Metaphysics

Ratio Vol. 14, No. 1, March 2001. (Philosophical Abstracts)

Article excerpt

Semantic Primitivism and Normativity, JAKOB HOHWY

Kripke-Wittgenstein meaning skepticism threatens the notion that there are facts in virtue of which meaning ascriptions are true or false. Some people argue that the only response is to adopt semantic primitivism (SP). SP is the doctrine that meaning-facts are sui generis and irreducibly semantic. The article argues that no version of SP can account for the normative and practical aspects of meaning while remaining nonreductive. A sparse SP cannot deal with the paradox. An SP, enriched with an intuitive epistemology, can only explain the practical aspect of meaning by aligning itself with reductive use-based accounts of meaning. Finally, we have no reason to think an SP with essential relations between meanings and meaning-bearers is really nonreductive. Therefore Kripke-Wittgenstein meaning skepticism should not lead us to adopt SP, instead we should re-examine use-based, dispositionalist accounts of meaning.--Correspondence to: filhohwy@hum.au.dk

Translations and Theories: On the Difference between Indeterminacy and Underdetermination, JEANNE PEIJNENBURG and RONALD HUNNEMAN.

Despite Quine's recurrent claims to the contrary, the idea is still widespread that indeterminacy of translation is a special case of underdetermination of theories. This paper shows how indeterminacy differs from underdetermination, and it explains in what ways such gifted Quine scholars as Ken Gemes and Lars Bergstr6m went astray. …

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